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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO  
COLLATERAL POST-CONVICTION REVIEW 
Carlos M. Vázquez* and Stephen I. Vladeck† 
For years, the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that, 
between them, Congress and the Supreme Court have rendered post-
conviction habeas review all but a dead letter. But in its January 2016 
decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court may have 
dramatically upended that understanding in holding—for the first 
time—that there are at least some cases in which the Constitution 
itself creates a right to collateral post-conviction review, i.e., cases in 
which a prisoner seeks to enforce retroactively a “new rule” of 
substantive constitutional law under the familiar doctrine of Teague v. 
Lane. 
On the surface, Montgomery held only that state courts are required 
to employ Teague’s retroactivity framework when and if they 
adjudicate habeas petitions relying on new substantive rules of federal 
law. But, in reaching that conclusion, the Court clarified that 
Teague’s holding that new substantive rules of federal law are 
retroactively applicable on collateral review was grounded in the 
Constitution, rather than common law or the federal habeas statute—
a holding that, as we explain, was both novel and important. 
We next consider which courts—state or federal—have the obligation 
to provide the constitutionally required collateral review recognized 
in Montgomery. Either way, the implications of Montgomery are far-
reaching. To conclude that the state courts must provide collateral 
review would run counter to the conventional wisdom that states are 
under no obligation to permit collateral attacks on convictions that 
have become final. On the other hand, the conclusion that federal 
courts must have jurisdiction to grant such collateral review is in 
significant tension with the Madisonian Compromise. In our view, the 
Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence establishes that the 
constitutionally required collateral remedy recognized in 
Montgomery must be available, in the first instance, in state courts, 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  
† Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
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even if the state has not chosen to provide collateral post-conviction 
relief for comparable state law claims. The state courts also have the 
constitutional power and duty to afford such relief to federal 
prisoners, but Congress has the power to withdraw such cases from 
the state courts by giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
such claims (and should be presumed to have done so). Thus, we 
conclude that the state courts are constitutionally obligated to afford 
collateral post-conviction review to state prisoners in the 
circumstances covered by Montgomery, and the federal courts should 
be presumed to have the statutory obligation to afford such review to 
federal prisoners. 
Finally, we examine some of the important questions raised by the 
conclusion that state and federal prisoners have a constitutional right 
to collateral relief. Although the questions are complex, and not all of 
the answers are clear, the uncertainties surrounding some of the 
contours of the remedy recognized in Montgomery should not obscure 
the fact that this seemingly innocuous holding about the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction actually upends a half-century’s worth 
of doctrinal and theoretical analyses of collateral post-conviction 
review, a result that should have a significant impact on both 
commentators’ and courts’ understanding of the relationship between 
collateral post-conviction remedies and the Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For years, the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that, 
between them, Congress and the Supreme Court have rendered post-
conviction habeas review all but a dead letter.1 At least outwardly, the 
Court’s October 2015 Term seemed to reflect that trend: not only did the 
Justices side with a federal habeas petitioner in only a single case,2 but 
the Court’s summary docket was once again replete with sternly worded 
reversals of lower-court grants of federal habeas relief.3 
On closer inspection, however, there is a far more interesting story to 
tell about the October 2015 Term—one in which the Justices took an 
important step towards expanding the scope of collateral post-conviction 
review, and indeed towards recognizing, for the first time in the Court’s 
history, that there are circumstances in which such review is 
constitutionally required. This Article will explain why, in a Term 
dominated by Justice Scalia’s passing and its impact, and by landmark 
rulings (or non-rulings) on abortion,4 affirmative action,5 immigration,6 
 
1 See, e.g., Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 859 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., concurring 
specially); Note, Suspended Justice: The Case Against 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s Statute of 
Limitations, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1090, 1090 (2016). 
2 See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). 
3 See, e.g., White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456, 462 (2015) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court again 
advises the Court of Appeals that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force even when 
reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the death penalty.”); cf. Rapelje v. Blackston, 
136 S. Ct. 388, 389–90 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“The 
Sixth Circuit seems to have acquired a taste for disregarding AEDPA. We should grant 
certiorari to discourage this appetite.” (citations omitted)).  
4 Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
5 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
6 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.). 
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and religious freedom,7 the most lasting constitutional and doctrinal 
ramifications of the October 2015 Term may ultimately arise from the 
Court’s January 2016 ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana.8 
On the surface, Montgomery is a straightforward case about the 
retroactive9 effect of the Supreme Court’s 2012 ruling in Miller v. 
Alabama, which had held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders, even for 
the crime of murder.10 Writing for a 6-3 majority in Montgomery, Justice 
Kennedy had little difficulty concluding that Miller was a “substantive” 
ruling under the familiar retroactivity framework of Teague v. Lane,11 
and that, as such, it fell within one of the two previously recognized 
exceptions to Teague’s general bar on retroactive enforcement of new 
rules via habeas. Because the constitutional rule articulated in Miller 
“necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a 
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him,”12 the Montgomery 
Court held that it could be retroactively enforced through claims for 
collateral post-conviction relief by prisoners whose convictions, 
sentences, and direct appeals had become final before Miller was handed 
down.13 
In order to reach the retroactivity question, though, the Court first had 
to resolve a thorny (and novel) jurisdictional issue that it had raised on 
its own motion.14 Unlike most of the Supreme Court’s post-conviction 
retroactivity cases, Montgomery came directly from the Louisiana state 
courts, which had purported to choose, as a matter of state law, to apply 
 
7 Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
8 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
9 As Justice Stevens cogently explained for the Court in Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 
264, 271 & n.5 (2008), describing efforts by prisoners to take advantage of new rules of 
constitutional law in terms of “retroactivity” is both confusing and misleading, given that 
“the source of a ‘new rule’ is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new 
rules of law.” Id. at 271. To avoid even more confusion, however, we follow the 
(problematic) convention throughout. 
10 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
11 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
12 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 
(2004)). 
13 Id. at 732–36. 
14 Id. at 727.  
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Teague in state post-conviction proceedings.15 Why didn’t that mean that 
the state court’s conclusion that Miller was “procedural” (and therefore 
not retroactive)16 rested upon an independent state law ground and was 
therefore insulated from Supreme Court appellate review?17 
One answer (which was offered by the parties in Montgomery and the 
Solicitor General as an amicus curiae) might have been that, once 
Louisiana chose to follow the Teague framework as a matter of state 
law, an erroneous application thereof would not be “independent” of 
federal law.18 But Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rested the Court’s 
jurisdiction to review the Louisiana court’s decision on a much broader 
conclusion, holding that Teague imposed a mandatory constitutional 
obligation on state courts to give retroactive effect in collateral post-
conviction proceedings to new substantive rules of constitutional law: 
“[W]hen a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the 
outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review 
courts to give retroactive effect to that rule.”19 As he continued, 
“Teague’s conclusion establishing the retroactivity of new substantive 
rules is best understood as resting upon constitutional premises. That 
constitutional command is, like all federal law, binding on state 
courts.”20 
As this Article explains in Part I, this reading of Teague was both 
novel and momentous. Jurists and commentators alike had long assumed 
that, like so much else of the Supreme Court’s post-conviction habeas 
jurisprudence, the Teague framework was merely an interpretation of the 
federal habeas statute—and that, as such, it was only binding upon the 
federal courts. The Supreme Court itself had implied as much, stating in 
 
15 See State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992). 
16 See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829 (La. 2013). 
17 See Peter W. Low et al., Federal Courts and the Law of Federal-State Relations 94 (7th 
ed. 2011). 
18 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041–42 (1983). The impact of Michigan v. Long 
was briefed by all sides in Montgomery. See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 
Arguing Against Jurisdiction at 6, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280); Brief of 
Respondent at 8, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280); Brief for Petitioner at 44, 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280). It was also discussed at length during oral 
argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–17, Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-
280).  
19 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729 (emphasis added).  
20 Id.  
COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
910 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:905 
 
2008 that “[n]ew constitutional rules announced by this Court that place 
certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond the power of the 
States to proscribe . . . must be applied in all future trials, all cases 
pending on direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedings.”21 
As Part I will demonstrate, however, Montgomery expressly extended 
the applicability of the Teague exceptions to state post-conviction 
proceedings—and, in the process, cemented the existence of a 
reviewable federal question whenever a state court fails to apply what, in 
the Supreme Court’s view, is a new rule of substantive constitutional 
law applicable to the case at hand. 
But, far more than confirm the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
over state-court refusals to apply new substantive rules retroactively, 
Montgomery’s reading of Teague compels the conclusion that prisoners 
(both state and federal) have a federal constitutional right to enforce 
retroactively new substantive rules of constitutional law (such as the one 
articulated in Miller)—and that they therefore have a constitutional right 
to a collateral post-conviction remedy in cases in which direct relief is 
no longer available. Montgomery confirms that state prisoners (and, by 
necessary implication, federal prisoners) have a right to such collateral 
relief if their continued incarceration contravenes a new substantive rule 
of federal constitutional law. 
If the Constitution entitles state and federal prisoners to a collateral 
post-conviction remedy, then either the state courts or the federal courts 
must be constitutionally obligated to provide such relief. In Part II, we 
consider whether the constitutionally required remedy recognized in 
Montgomery is available, as a constitutional matter, in state court or in 
federal court. With respect to the state courts, the conventional wisdom, 
as articulated by Justice Alito in a solo concurrence in Foster v. 
Chatman, another habeas case from the same Term, has long been that 
“[s]tates are under no obligation to permit collateral attacks on 
 
21 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (emphasis added). The Danforth Court 
also observed that “Justice O’Connor’s opinion clearly indicates that Teague’s general rule 
of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas 
statute.” Id. at 278. Tellingly, though, Danforth said nothing about whether the exceptions to 
Teague’s general rule were also statutory—or were, instead, constitutionally compelled. 
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convictions that have become final, and if they allow such attacks, they 
are free to limit the circumstances in which claims may be relitigated.”22 
With respect to the federal courts, it is widely understood to follow 
from the Madisonian Compromise—that is, the Framers’ decision to 
leave it to Congress to decide whether or not to create lower federal 
courts—that Article III itself places no limits on Congress’s power to 
restrict the jurisdiction of such courts.23 If Montgomery stands for the 
proposition that either the state or the federal courts must have 
jurisdiction to grant collateral relief to prisoners whose continued 
incarceration contravenes a new substantive rule of federal constitutional 
law, then it either refutes the conventional wisdom articulated by Justice 
Alito regarding the state courts or it upends a bedrock principle of 
constitutional law regarding Congress’s power to control the jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts. 
Where state prisoners are concerned, we conclude that the 
constitutional obligation falls on the state courts. This conclusion is 
supported by two lines of cases interpreting the Supremacy Clause. The 
first establishes that the state courts must entertain federal claims in the 
absence of a “valid excuse,” and that a jurisdictional limitation is not a 
valid excuse if it discriminates against federal law or otherwise reflects 
disagreement with the policy underlying the federal law.24 As we explain 
in Section II.A, any state law denying its courts jurisdiction to grant 
collateral relief to prisoners who are incarcerated in contravention of a 
new rule of substantive federal law would be based, at bottom, on 
disagreement with the policies underlying the Constitution, as 
interpreted in Montgomery. 
 
22 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1759 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); 
see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“State collateral 
proceedings are not constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings 
and serve a different and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”); 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide 
[postconviction] relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due 
Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well.” (citation omitted)). 
Although Justice Alito was writing only for himself in Foster, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Thomas, and Justice Gorsuch recently endorsed this view. See Johnson v. Alabama, 137 S. 
Ct. 2292, 2293 (2017) (mem.) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing state collateral review 
as “purely a creature of state law that need not be provided at all”). 
23 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850).  
24 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1947). 
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The same conclusion is supported by a separate line of Supremacy 
Clause cases establishing that state laws disempowering state courts of 
general jurisdiction from awarding a constitutionally required remedy do 
not qualify as adequate state grounds preventing Supreme Court 
review.25 These decisions rest on the premise that the state courts of 
general jurisdiction must be empowered to grant constitutionally 
required remedies—a category that now includes the collateral remedy 
recognized in Montgomery. 
Unlike state legislatures, Congress has the power to deny the state 
courts jurisdiction over federal claims. It may do this by giving the 
lower federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.26 It is clear, 
however, that Congress has not given the federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over collateral claims brought by state prisoners on the basis 
of new rules of federal law. Indeed, Congress’s most recent legislation 
on the subject, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 (AEDPA),27 appears to place severe limits on the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to grant such relief. Although we think AEDPA should be 
interpreted to authorize the federal courts to grant the constitutionally 
required relief, we do not think the statute can plausibly be read to give 
the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to do so. Thus, with respect to 
state prisoners, we think that, after Montgomery, the conventional 
wisdom repeated by Justice Alito in Foster v. Chatman is no longer 
tenable. 
As Section II.B explains, the analysis with respect to federal prisoners 
is more complex in light of the Supreme Court’s 1872 decision in 
Tarble’s Case, and its apparent holding that state courts are 
constitutionally unable to grant habeas relief to persons detained by the 
federal government.28 Some have argued that it must follow that federal 
courts are constitutionally empowered to grant habeas relief to persons 
 
25 See, e.g., Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 228 (1908); see also Reich v. Collins, 513 
U.S. 106, 110–13 (1994) (holding that state courts must provide remedy required by the Due 
Process Clause notwithstanding “the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their 
own courts”); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26–
31 (1990) (same). 
26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012). 
27 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 40, 42, 
and 50 U.S.C.). 
28 Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872). 
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illegally detained by federal officials, and, indeed, that the Court so held 
in Boumediene v. Bush.29 But this conclusion clashes with the 
Madisonian Compromise, mentioned above. We endorse an alternative 
interpretation of Tarble’s Case that reconciles it with the Madisonian 
Compromise. Under this interpretation, Tarble’s Case rests on the 
conclusion that Congress implicitly withdrew the state courts’ 
jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to federal detainees when it created 
lower federal courts and gave them jurisdiction to grant such relief.30 We 
argue further that Tarble’s Case and Boumediene reflect the Court’s 
strong presumption that Congress would prefer that any constitutionally 
required remedies against federal officials be sought in the federal courts 
rather than the state courts. Accordingly, federal jurisdictional statutes 
should be read to authorize the federal courts to grant such relief unless 
Congress clearly expresses a desire to have such claims adjudicated in 
the state courts instead. 
This analysis leads us to conclude that the default forum established 
by the Constitution in which to seek constitutionally required remedies 
against federal officials is the state courts. But, with respect to claims by 
federal prisoners, this default forum was statutorily displaced when 
Congress created lower federal courts and gave them habeas jurisdiction. 
Any jurisdictional limitation restricting the lower federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to grant a remedy should be understood to reflect Congress’s 
view that the remedy in question is constitutionally optional. If the 
federal courts conclude that the remedy is constitutionally required, they 
should apply the presumption we have drawn from Tarble’s Case and 
Boumediene and interpret the statute to authorize the lower federal 
courts to award the remedy. Thus, in the absence of a clear statement by 
Congress that it would prefer federal detentions to be challenged in state 
court, federal courts should construe the federal habeas statutes to permit 
collateral relief for federal prisoners to the extent such relief is required 
by the Constitution, as construed in Montgomery. 
Finally, Part III fleshes out some of the broader doctrinal implications 
of our analysis in Parts I and II. Our aim is to flag some important issues 
 
29 553 U.S. 723, 732, 745 (2008); see, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, Did the Madisonian 
Compromise Survive Detention at Guantanamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 536–39 (2010). 
30 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The 
Federal System 434 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] (setting forth the “implied 
exclusion” reading of Tarble’s Case). 
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and to offer some preliminary views rather than to discuss the issues 
exhaustively. 
First, what types of claims does Montgomery require to be 
enforceable on collateral review? Montgomery itself involved a claim 
that the prisoner’s continued incarceration contravenes a new 
substantive rule of federal constitutional law. We argue in Section III.A 
that the right to collateral review also attaches to the other exception to 
nonretroactivity recognized in Teague—for new “watershed” rules of 
criminal procedure—because, as with new substantive rules of 
constitutional law, the underlying claim is that the articulation of the 
new rule vitiates the prisoner’s ongoing detention. With respect to 
federal prisoners, the right to collateral relief also attaches if the 
defendant’s incarceration contravenes a new decision construing the 
substantive scope of the statute the prisoner was convicted of violating. 
A more difficult question is whether a state prisoner is 
constitutionally entitled to collateral relief when the state courts 
articulate a new substantive rule of state law. Answering this question 
requires a deeper analysis of the constitutional basis of the Court’s 
decision in Montgomery. We think the decision is based, at bottom, on 
the Court’s understanding of the nature of the federal judiciary’s role in 
interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions bearing on the 
permissibility of primary conduct. We conclude that the Constitution 
probably does not require the states to regard the role of their courts in 
the same way. Accordingly, we don’t think Montgomery establishes a 
general rule of retroactive applicability of new substantive rules of state 
law—although it might justifiably lead state courts to interpret their own 
constitutions to establish such a rule. 
Second, we consider in Section III.B at what point the right to a 
collateral post-conviction remedy recognized in Montgomery accrues. 
Can a prisoner claim a constitutional entitlement to a collateral post-
conviction remedy before the Supreme Court has actually recognized a 
new rule falling within Teague’s exceptions? Although Teague itself 
permitted federal habeas courts to entertain a claim seeking initial 
recognition of such a new rule, and although we think that state courts 
should provide post-conviction remedies in such cases, we believe that, 
fairly read, the Constitution does not oblige them to do so. As we 
explain in Section III.B, the constitutional right to collateral relief 
recognized in Montgomery arises upon the Supreme Court’s recognition 
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of a new rule falling within Teague’s exception for new substantive 
rules—and not before that point. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we consider in Section III.C 
the validity of a number of common procedural limitations, as applied to 
the remedy recognized in Montgomery. With respect to any state statutes 
of limitations, we think Montgomery requires that the clock be restarted 
once the new rule is handed down by the Supreme Court. We also 
believe that, notwithstanding any state rule barring second or successive 
collateral post-conviction petitions, Montgomery requires federal and 
state courts (with respect to federal and state prisoners, respectively) to 
entertain such claims even if the claim had been considered and rejected 
before the Court’s recognition of the new rule. We thus believe that 
Montgomery raises substantial doubts about the validity of some of the 
limits AEDPA imposes on federal prisoners’ ability to raise claims 
based on new rules in a second or successive petition. 
Whether states may deny relief based on procedural default rules 
presents more complicated questions. Ordinarily, states may regard a 
claim as procedurally defaulted if it was not raised at trial or on direct 
review. Must a state waive the procedural default if the Supreme Court 
recognizes the claim for the first time after the prisoner’s conviction 
became final? The Supreme Court has held that federal habeas courts 
should waive this sort of procedural default if the prisoner lacked the 
tools with which to construct the argument at the time of his trial.31 We 
think that, after Montgomery, state courts might be constitutionally 
required to excuse procedural defaults under the same circumstances. 
*    *    * 
Lest we lose sight of the forest, though, we stress that the conclusion 
that there are any circumstances in which the Constitution requires 
access to collateral post-conviction review represents an enormously 
important doctrinal advance, calling into question decades of 
conventional scholarly and judicial wisdom, even if there remains some 
uncertainty as to the specific circumstances that trigger such a 
constitutional right. Moreover, recognizing the significance of 
Montgomery’s jurisdictional holding should open the door to the 
revisiting of any number of other assumptions about the contemporary 
 
31 See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130–34 (1982). 
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structure of post-conviction remedies—a task that is far beyond the 
scope of this Article. Instead, our goal is to explain how and why, in a 
seemingly innocuous holding about the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, Montgomery upends a half-century’s worth of doctrinal and 
theoretical analyses of collateral post-conviction review, a result that 
could have a significant impact on both commentators’ and courts’ 
understanding of the relationship between collateral post-conviction 
remedies and the Constitution. 
I. THE SOURCE OF THE REMEDY FOR “NEW RULES”:  
FROM TEAGUE TO MONTGOMERY 
To understand the significance of Montgomery’s jurisdictional 
holding, it is important to situate that decision against the backdrop of 
the Supreme Court’s evolving approach to retroactivity over the past 
half-century. This evolution was triggered by the Warren Court’s 
invigoration and incorporation of myriad new constitutional protections 
in criminal proceedings in the 1960s, which in turn raised complex 
questions about whether (and when) prisoners already convicted could 
avail themselves of such “new rules.”32 
Before 1965, the Court had allowed all new rules to be retroactively 
enforced on direct and collateral review alike.33 But as the Justices 
applied the exclusionary rule to the states,34 recognized a right to counsel 
in all criminal cases,35 articulated prophylactic rules limiting custodial 
interrogations,36 and so on, they sought to moderate the impact of their 
jurisprudence by limiting the circumstances in which these new rulings 
could be applied to judicial proceedings that predated them. After some 
clumsy first steps,37 a majority eventually coalesced around a three-
factor test for when a new rule would apply retroactively, turning on (1) 
 
32 See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 30, at 1293 (“The retroactivity question grew in 
significance during the 1960s as a result of . . . the Warren Court, and that Court’s broad and 
novel criminal procedure decisions, of which Miranda is an example.”).  
33 See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 272 (2008); see also id. at 293 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  
34 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961). 
35 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963). 
36 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436–37 (1966). 
37 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 618–19 (1965). 
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the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule; 
and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive 
application of the new rule.38 But the Court never explained (perhaps 
because it could not agree upon) where these factors came from, or the 
textual source of the imperative that new rules satisfying these factors 
must be retroactively enforceable. 
And, critically for present purposes, the Warren Court’s 
understanding of retroactivity did not differentiate between direct 
appeals and collateral post-conviction review. As long as the three 
factors summarized in Stovall v. Denno militated in favor of retroactive 
application, the new rule would apply to all cases on both direct and 
collateral post-conviction review. Thus, the specific nature of the “new 
rule,” rather than the difference between direct appeals and collateral 
post-conviction review, was central to the applicability of that rule under 
the Warren Court’s framework. 
A. Justice Harlan and the Teague Framework 
The Court’s current approach to retroactivity has its roots in 
concurring opinions of the second Justice Harlan, who forcefully argued 
that the distinction between direct and collateral review was of central 
importance. As he explained in separate opinions in Desist v. United 
States39 and Mackey v. United States,40 so long as a direct appeal was 
pending, application of a “new rule” wasn’t ever truly retroactive, since 
courts (including appellate courts) had an obligation (perhaps grounded 
in the Constitution) to resolve the case before them based on then-extant 
law.41 Collateral post-conviction review was different, Harlan argued, 
because it was an extraordinary remedy in which no such obligation 
existed, and because countervailing principles of comity and finality 
dictated at least some deference to the underlying (and completed) 
criminal proceeding.42 Thus, as he explained in Mackey, new rules 
should generally not be enforceable through collateral post-conviction 
review. 
 
38 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). 
39 394 U.S. 244, 256–69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
40 401 U.S. 667, 675–702 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
41 See, e.g., id. at 679. 
42 See id. at 681–702. 
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At the same time, though, Justice Harlan agreed that there should be 
two circumstances in which new rules could—and, indeed, should—be 
retroactively enforceable even through actions seeking collateral post-
conviction relief: 
First, . . . those [new rules] that place, as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, 
must . . . be placed on a different footing . . . because [they] 
represent[] the clearest instance where finality interests should yield. 
There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest 
at a point where it ought properly never to repose. . . . Thus, the 
obvious interest in freeing individuals from punishment for conduct 
that is constitutionally protected seems . . . sufficiently substantial to 
justify applying current notions of substantive due process to petitions 
for habeas corpus. 
Secondly, I think the writ ought always to lie for claims of 
nonobservance of those procedures that . . . are “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.” . . . [where] time and growth in social 
capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly 
demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found 
to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.43 
In other words, the Harlan approach would have allowed for collateral 
enforcement of new rules either when the rule vitiates the substantive 
basis for the defendant’s conviction (or sentence), or when it is so 
fundamental to the procedural fairness of the proceeding that the trial 
court’s failure to have observed it warrants the conclusion that the 
conviction is not just voidable, but void. Although Harlan marshalled 
numerous examples of the former, the only example he offered of the 
latter was the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants 
recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright.44 
Most importantly for present purposes, neither of Harlan’s lengthy 
discussions of his proposed retroactivity framework explained the 
 
43 Id. at 692–93 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
44 See id. at 694 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963)). 
COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2017] Constitutional Right to Collateral Review 919 
 
source of the two exceptions—and whether they were a creature of 
statute (or federal common law), or might instead, like the enforceability 
of new rules on direct appeal, be constitutionally compelled. The only 
hint Harlan provided was that the task before the Court was to “resettl[e] 
the limits of the reach of the Great Writ,”45 without clarifying whether 
he meant the Great Writ enshrined in the Constitution, or the one 
Congress had provided by statute beginning with the Judiciary Act of 
1789.46 
The Supreme Court took a decisive step toward embracing Harlan’s 
framework in Griffith v. Kentucky, holding that new rules should be 
fully retroactive on direct review, whether or not they satisfied the 
Stovall approach.47 Two years later, in Teague v. Lane, the Court 
embraced the other half of Harlan’s framework, holding that new rules 
generally are not retroactively enforceable through collateral post-
conviction review, unless they fall within one of Harlan’s two 
exceptions.48 As Justice O’Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality:49 
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a 
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality 
which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. 
Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent 
effect. The fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal 
prosecutions “shows only that conventional notions of finality should 
not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation, not that they 
should have none.”50 
 
45 Id. at 701–02. 
46 On the neglected significance of the divergence between the constitutional (“common-
law”) writ and its “chimerical statutory twin,” see Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas 
Revisionism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 941, 978–87 (2011) (reviewing Paul D. Halliday, Habeas 
Corpus: From England to Empire (2010)). 
47 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987). 
48 489 U.S. 288, 305–07 (1989). The Teague Court explained that it adopted the second 
exception “with a modification,” reading it to encompass even fewer rules of criminal 
procedure than Justice Harlan had likely meant. See id. at 311–12. 
49 Although Teague itself only commanded four votes on the relevant holdings, subsequent 
majorities of the Court have routinely endorsed and relied upon it. See Hart & Wechsler, 
supra note 30, at 1295. 
50 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 150 (1970)).  
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Teague thereby embraced the rest of Justice Harlan’s retroactivity 
framework51—endorsing, but shedding no further light on the source of 
the exceptions Justice Harlan had outlined in Mackey.52 And although 
Justice Brennan’s dissent argued that Justice O’Connor’s opinion was 
based on a misreading of the federal habeas statute (and in any event 
failed to honor the strong presumption in favor of stare decisis in non-
constitutional cases),53 Justice White’s concurrence was more equivocal 
on the source of Justice Harlan’s framework, cryptically noting that 
some aspects of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence “appear to have 
constitutional underpinnings.”54 
B. The Debate Over Teague’s Exceptions 
Teague’s silence as to the provenance of its exceptions—and whether 
they were grounded in the habeas statute, federal common law, or the 
Constitution—remained in the background, as most of the academic and 
judicial commentary on the decision focused on its adoption of the 
underlying nonretroactivity framework and its broad reading of what 
constitutes a “new rule.”55 After all, whether Teague’s exceptions 
derived from the federal habeas statute or the Constitution made no 
difference to federal courts; either way, they provided a basis for relief 
 
51 Teague quietly departs from Harlan’s framework in one crucial respect (albeit one that 
is not material here), for its definition of when a Supreme Court decision is a “new rule”—
when “the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final”—is much more capacious than anything Harlan suggested in 
Desist or Mackey, and has the effect of triggering the retroactivity framework in a far greater 
number of cases. Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted); see also supra note 48 (noting that the Court 
in Teague modified Harlan’s second exception). 
52 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310 (“[W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of retroactivity for 
cases on collateral review. Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have 
become final before the new rules are announced.”). 
53 See id. at 326–27, 332–33 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
54 Id. at 317 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
55 For just a sampling of the voluminous literature on Teague, see the sources cited in Hart 
& Wechsler, supra note 30, at 1299–1300 & nn.7–8. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & 
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1731, 1738–44 (1991). 
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on the merits in cases to which they applied.56 And, until Congress 
dramatically scaled back the scope of federal post-conviction habeas 
review in AEDPA, there was little need for state prisoners to resort to 
state collateral post-conviction proceedings to take advantage of new 
rules of federal constitutional law—federal courts generally provided a 
much better forum. 
In several respects, AEDPA put new pressure on the Teague 
framework. First, it introduced a one-year statute of limitations for all 
federal post-conviction habeas cases.57 Second, it dramatically raised the 
bar for second-or-successive federal habeas petitioners to take advantage 
of new rules, barring courts of appeals from even authorizing the pursuit 
of such claims (let alone reaching the merits thereof) unless and until the 
new rule at issue had already been “made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court.”58 Third, and more generally, 
AEDPA’s constraints on the substantive scope of federal habeas relief 
created both formal and informal pressures on state collateral post-
conviction proceedings, raising the question Teague had not answered as 
to how its retroactivity framework should apply in such cases.59 
How the Supreme Court itself applied Teague may also have put 
pressure on its framework, as the Court repeatedly refused to hold that 
decisions articulating major new constitutional procedural protections in 
criminal cases (such as Ring v. Arizona,60 Crawford v. Washington,61 and 
Padilla v. Kentucky62) satisfied the second of Justice Harlan’s 
 
56 For a rare exception—and a pre-AEDPA look at Teague’s impact on state post-
conviction proceedings—see Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of 
Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 421 (1993). 
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012) (state prisoners); id. § 2255(f) (federal prisoners). 
58 See id. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (state prisoners); id. § 2255(h)(2) (federal prisoners). See 
generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Using the Supreme Court’s Original Habeas Jurisdiction To 
“Ma[k]e” New Rules Retroactive, 28 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 225 (2016). 
59 Outside the context of Teague, AEDPA’s narrowing of the scope of federal post-
conviction habeas has had an even greater impact on state post-conviction proceedings, 
leading to the rise of what some have called “the new state postconviction.” See Giovanna 
Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 Akron L. Rev. 473 (2013). 
60 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
61 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
62 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
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exceptions—for “watershed” rules of criminal procedure.63 Unable to 
enforce these new rules retroactively in federal habeas petitions, 
prisoners turned to state collateral post-conviction proceedings, forcing 
the question of how Teague’s nonretroactivity regime applied in the 
state courts—if at all. 
The Supreme Court answered that question in part in Danforth v. 
Minnesota,64 holding that states are free to apply new rules retroactively 
even when such rules do not fall within the Teague exceptions. To reach 
this result, Danforth split Teague’s framework into two: the general bar 
against retroactive enforcement of new rules via collateral post-
conviction review, and the specific exceptions first identified by Justice 
Harlan. As Justice Stevens explained, “the case before us now does not 
involve either of the ‘Teague exceptions.’”65 Instead, it raised only 
Teague’s “general rule of nonretroactivity,” which “was an exercise of 
this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute.”66 And because 
the federal habeas statute only applies to federal habeas petitions, 
Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity did not bind state courts.67 
But, with one exception,68 Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in 
Danforth was careful to limit itself to what it called Teague’s “general 
rule,” and to leave open whether Teague’s “exceptions” were also not 
binding upon state courts. So understood, Danforth left states free to 
apply retroactively even those new rules that did not fall into one of the 
Teague exceptions (and so were not retroactive under Teague). But the 
Court left open whether states could decline to apply retroactively those 
new rules that did fall into a Teague exception (and so were retroactive 
under Teague). 
 
63 See Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 344 (2013) (Padilla not retroactive); 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 409 (2007) (Crawford not retroactive); Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 349 (2004) (Ring not retroactive). 
64 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008). 
65 Id. at 277. 
66 Id. at 278. 
67 Id. at 278–79. 
68 The very first sentence of the Danforth majority opinion explained, perhaps inartfully, 
that “[n]ew constitutional rules announced by this Court that place certain kinds of primary 
individual conduct beyond the power of the States to proscribe, as well as ‘watershed’ rules 
of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trials, all cases pending on direct review, 
and all federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Id. at 266 (emphasis added). 
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C. The Significance of Montgomery 
That exact fact pattern presented itself in Montgomery, in which a 
state prisoner sought to avail himself of the Supreme Court’s 2012 
decision in Miller v. Alabama—which had held that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the imposition upon a juvenile offender of a 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, even for 
murder.69 Although Louisiana’s state courts had chosen to follow the 
Teague framework in state post-conviction proceedings as a matter of 
state law,70 they had also held prior to Montgomery’s case that Miller 
did not fall within the first Teague exception71—and therefore could not 
be retroactively enforced via collateral post-conviction review.72 
Montgomery’s application for collateral state post-conviction relief 
under Miller was therefore denied, a decision from which he petitioned 
for certiorari. 
At the certiorari stage, neither Montgomery nor Louisiana raised 
concerns about the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review the state 
court’s application of Teague. Instead, the Court raised the issue sua 
sponte when it granted review, adding the jurisdictional question to the 
grant and appointing an amicus curiae to take the adverse position.73 The 
core of the amicus’s argument in opposition to jurisdiction was the view 
that the entire Teague framework—including the exceptions—was a 
construction of the federal habeas statute, and that any doubt on that 
point was settled in Danforth. Thus, he argued, “The federal habeas 
statute supplied the exclusive source of the Teague exceptions to 
finality,”74 and “Danforth’s rationale explains that Teague’s exceptions 
 
69 See 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
70 See Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1296 (La. 1992). 
71 To be sure, Louisiana was not an outlier; by the time the Court granted certiorari, the 
question of Miller’s retroactivity had produced a remarkable 23-20 split in lower-court 
authority—with 11 state and 12 federal cases holding it to be nonretroactive, and 12 state 
and 8 federal cases holding it to be retroactive. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280). 
72 See State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 844 (La. 2013). 
73 See Montgomery, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015) (mem.); see also Jason M. Zarrow & William 
H. Milliken, Retroactivity, the Due Process Clause, and the Federal Question in Montgomery 
v. Louisiana, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online 42, 44–45 (2015) (summarizing the jurisdictional issue 
shortly after the grant of certiorari). 
74 Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Arguing Against Jurisdiction at 23, 
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718 (No. 14-280). 
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to finality are based on the federal habeas statute.”75 Neither of these 
statements is correct; as discussed above, Teague implicitly and 
Danforth explicitly avoided saying anything about the source of the 
exceptions to Teague, as opposed to the general rule of nonretroactivity. 
That does not resolve the jurisdictional question against the amicus; it 
merely suggests that it was a matter of first impression in Montgomery. 
Any doubt on that point was quickly put to rest by Justice Kennedy 
(one of the two dissenters in Danforth),76 who opened the majority 
opinion in Montgomery by explaining why the answer to the 
jurisdictional question was not foreordained: 
Neither Teague nor Danforth had reason to address whether States are 
required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive effect to new 
substantive or watershed procedural rules. Teague originated in a 
federal, not state, habeas proceeding; so it had no particular reason to 
discuss whether any part of its holding was required by the 
Constitution in addition to the federal habeas statute. And Danforth 
held only that Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity was an 
interpretation of the federal habeas statute and does not prevent States 
from providing greater relief in their own collateral review courts. The 
Danforth majority limited its analysis to Teague’s general retroactivity 
bar, leaving open the question whether Teague’s two exceptions are 
binding on the States as a matter of constitutional law.77 
Turning to the question Danforth “left open,” Montgomery held that 
“when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome 
of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give 
retroactive effect to that rule.”78 This was so, Justice Kennedy explained, 
because “[s]ubstantive rules . . . set forth categorical constitutional 
guarantees that place certain criminal laws and punishments altogether 
beyond the State’s power to impose. It follows that when a State 
enforces a proscription or penalty barred by the Constitution, the 
 
75 Id. at 24. 
76 The other Danforth dissenter—Chief Justice Roberts—joined Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Montgomery. 
77 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 728–29. 
78 Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 
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resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful.”79 Nor did it 
make a difference if the state enforcement is “retroactive”: “A penalty 
imposed pursuant to an unconstitutional law is no less void because the 
prisoner’s sentence became final before the law was held 
unconstitutional. There is no grandfather clause that permits States to 
enforce punishments the Constitution forbids. To conclude otherwise 
would undercut the Constitution’s substantive guarantees.”80 
Finally, as Justice Kennedy concluded, “[i]f a State may not 
constitutionally insist that a prisoner remain in jail on federal habeas 
review, it may not constitutionally insist on the same result in its own 
postconviction proceedings,”81 without running afoul of the Supremacy 
Clause. Thus, “[w]here state collateral review proceedings permit 
prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot 
refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive constitutional right that 
determines the outcome of that challenge.”82 Because Louisiana had 
opened its courts to such challenges, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction 
to review the state courts’ refusal to apply Miller retroactively (and, 
ultimately, to reverse that holding).83 
In what would turn out to be his very last opinion,84 Justice Scalia 
(joined in full by Justices Thomas and Alito) dissented on both the 
jurisdictional question and the merits, arguing with respect to the former 
that “[n]either Teague nor its exceptions are constitutionally 
compelled. . . . Any relief a prisoner might receive in a state court after 
finality is a matter of grace, not constitutional prescription.”85 The 
majority’s contrary conclusion, Justice Scalia objected, would not only 
 
79 Id. at 729–30. 
80 Id. at 731. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 731–32. 
83 Technically, the Court could have resolved the jurisdictional question without 
identifying the source of the right. As we noted above, the mere fact that Louisiana had 
adopted the Teague framework was arguably enough to establish that the state ground was 
not independent. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
84 Montgomery was one of four decisions in argued cases handed down on January 25, 
2016—the last time the Court issued such rulings before Justice Scalia’s passing. And 
because Justice Kennedy was the senior Justice among the authors of the four majority 
opinions, Montgomery was announced from the bench (and released to the public) last. 
85 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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impose an unprecedented obligation upon state courts, but upon federal 
courts as well, since recognition that Teague’s exceptions were 
grounded in the Constitution would deprive Congress of the power “to 
do away with Teague’s exceptions altogether.”86 “Until today,” Justice 
Scalia concluded, “no federal court was constitutionally obliged to grant 
relief for the past violation of a newly announced substantive rule.”87 
In light of Justice Scalia’s dissent (and the brief of the Court-
appointed amicus), it would be difficult to accuse the Montgomery 
majority of missing the significance of its jurisdictional analysis. The 
amicus presented the Court with a choice between grounding Teague’s 
exceptions in the federal habeas statute or the Constitution, and Justice 
Scalia’s dissent highlighted the consequences—for both state and 
federal courts—of the majority’s holding that Teague’s exceptions 
derive directly from the Constitution. Moreover, both Montgomery and 
Louisiana (and the United States, as amicus curiae) had offered a 
narrower ground for jurisdiction—that the state law ground was not truly 
“independent,” since it was interwoven with federal law. Thus, the Court 
in Montgomery consciously rested its jurisdictional holding on broader 
grounds than may have been strictly necessary, with full awareness of 
the fact that it was constitutionalizing Teague’s exceptions. What it may 
not have fully appreciated, as we explain in Part II, is just how far-
reaching the consequences of that result necessarily are. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED JUDICIAL FORUM 
As discussed in Part I, the Court in Montgomery held that state (and, 
necessarily, federal) prisoners have a right not to be incarcerated in 
contravention of new substantive rules of federal constitutional law, and 
that this right itself has a constitutional basis. It follows that either state 
or federal courts, or both, have a constitutional obligation to entertain 
prisoners’ collateral claims that their continued incarceration 
contravenes new substantive rules initially recognized after the 
conclusion of their direct appeals. This Part considers whether the 
Constitution imposes this obligation on the state courts or the federal 
courts, or both. 
 
86 Id. at 741. 
87 Id. 
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Before addressing that question, we briefly consider another 
possibility: that both federal and state courts have an obligation to 
provide collateral review and grant collateral relief to prisoners whose 
continued incarceration contravenes a new substantive rule of 
constitutional law only if they have been given jurisdiction to entertain 
collateral claims under state or federal statutes. We believe this 
possibility is precluded by the Constitution. We do not claim that the 
principle invoked by the Court in Marbury v. Madison, that for every 
violation of a legal right there must be a remedy,88 is an unyielding one. 
We agree with Professors Fallon and Meltzer that this principle is “not 
an ironclad rule, and [that] its ideal is not always attained.”89 Indeed, as 
Fallon and Meltzer have argued, Teague itself exemplifies the limits of 
this principle insofar as it denies a collateral remedy for convictions that 
contravene most new rules of constitutional law.90 But, as the Court 
confirmed in Montgomery, the Constitution does require a collateral 
remedy for persons incarcerated in contravention of a new substantive 
rule of constitutional law. 
The question here is not whether the Constitution requires a remedy 
for the violation of a constitutional right. It is, rather, whether the 
Constitution requires a judicial forum for the enforcement of an 
affirmative remedy the Supreme Court has now held (in Montgomery) to 
be constitutionally required. When the Constitution requires a remedy 
for the ongoing violation of a constitutional right involving individual 
liberty, we believe that the Constitution requires that some court be 
available to provide the remedy. The “necessity” of the conclusion 
reached by the Court in General Oil Co. v. Crain is equally applicable 
here: “If a [constitutionally required remedy] is precluded in the national 
courts . . . and may be forbidden by a state to its courts, . . . it must be 
evident that an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement of many 
provisions of the Constitution.”91 
In this Part, we consider whether the constitutional remedy to which 
persons incarcerated in contravention of new substantive rules of 
constitutional law are entitled is available, as a constitutional matter, in 
 
88 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
89 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 54, at 1778. 
90 See id. at 1807–20. 
91 209 U.S. 211, 226 (1908). 
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the state courts or in the federal courts. We consider this issue separately 
for two categories of prisoners: those in state custody and those in 
federal custody. 
A. State Prisoners 
In Montgomery, the Court did not have to decide whether the 
Louisiana state courts were constitutionally obligated to provide a forum 
in which state prisoners could seek collateral post-conviction relief on 
the basis of new substantive rules of constitutional law. As noted above, 
Louisiana did allow state prisoners to obtain collateral review of their 
convictions for consistency with federal law. For this reason, the Court 
in Montgomery could limit itself to holding that, “[i]f a state collateral 
proceeding is open to a claim controlled by federal law, the state court 
‘has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.’”92 As to whether 
states are constitutionally required to open their courts to collateral 
claims by state prisoners, the conventional view has long been the one 
expressed by Justice Alito in Foster v. Chatman: “States are under no 
obligation to permit collateral attacks on convictions that have become 
final, and if they allow such attacks, they are free to limit the 
circumstances in which claims may be relitigated.”93 
Whether state prisoners have a right to collateral relief based on new 
rules in federal courts under current statutes is highly uncertain. Under 
the revisions to the habeas statute enacted in 1996 as part of AEDPA, a 
state prisoner may not obtain collateral relief in the federal courts unless 
the state court’s “adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
 
92 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731 (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218 (1988)). 
93 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1759 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“State collateral proceedings are not 
constitutionally required as an adjunct to the state criminal proceedings and serve a different 
and more limited purpose than either the trial or appeal.”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 
551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide [postconviction] relief, and when 
they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that 
the State supply a lawyer as well.” (citation omitted)). As noted above, see supra note 22, 
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Gorsuch now appear to agree with this 
view. See Johnson v. Alabama, 137 S. Ct. 2292, 2293 (2017) (mem.) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (describing state collateral review as “purely a creature of state law that need not 
be provided at all”). 
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United States.”94 The statute thus does not appear to permit relief on the 
basis of any rules that were recognized by the Supreme Court after the 
conviction.95 To be sure, there are plausible grounds for exempting 
claims falling within the two Teague exceptions from this section as a 
matter of statutory interpretation. Thus far, though, the Court has noted 
the issue but not resolved it.96 
Unless the Court reads such an exemption into Section 2254(d)(1), 
AEDPA raises the constitutional issue addressed in this Part. If AEDPA 
does not preserve federal habeas review of state convictions for 
consistency with new substantive rules of constitutional law, and if 
Justice Alito is right about the freedom of states to close their courts to 
collateral claims, then some state prisoners may find themselves with no 
judicial forum in which to seek the remedy the Court in Montgomery 
held was constitutionally required. Either AEDPA is unconstitutional in 
this regard or the state courts are constitutionally required to afford 
collateral relief to persons incarcerated in contravention of new 
substantive rules of federal constitutional law. 
In our view, the constitutionally required forum for the remedy the 
Court recognized in Montgomery is the state courts. This conclusion is 
supported by the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the obligations of 
the states under the Supremacy Clause to provide a forum for the 
adjudication of federal claims, as well as by decisions holding that state 
laws denying their courts the jurisdiction to grant a constitutionally 
required remedy do not constitute an adequate state ground barring 
direct review of a state court decision in the Supreme Court. Congress 
can confer such authority on the federal courts, and can make the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction over such claims exclusive. But unless and until it 
 
94 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
95 This provision applies only to claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings.” Id. If the claim was not adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, it is likely 
that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Although there may be some claims that were not 
adjudicated on the merits in state courts yet were not procedurally defaulted, the number of 
such claims is likely very small. In any event, the text of § 2254(d)(1) appears to permit 
claims based on new rules of constitutional law only if they were not adjudicated in state 
court and if there was both cause and prejudice to excuse the prisoner’s default. On the 
“cause and prejudice” standard, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 30, at 1337–45. 
96 See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 n.* (2011). 
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has done so, the state courts have both the power and the obligation to 
entertain such claims. 
1. Collateral Relief for State Prisoners in State Court 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom repeated by Justice Alito in 
Foster v. Chatman, states are not entirely “free to limit the 
circumstances” in which their courts are open to collateral review of 
criminal convictions.97 In Montgomery, the Court held that, at a 
minimum, “[i]f a state collateral proceeding is open to a claim controlled 
by federal law, the state court ‘has a duty to grant the relief that federal 
law requires.’”98 Settled precedent further establishes that states are not 
free to close their courts to collateral claims based on federal law. 
a. The Testa Line of Cases 
First, and most narrowly, it is clear that, once a state opens its 
courthouse doors to particular classes of claims, it cannot discriminate 
against federal claims. This nondiscrimination feature of the Supremacy 
Clause, recognized in such cases as McKnett v. St. Louis & San 
Francisco R.R. Co.99 and Testa v. Katt,100 has been generally accepted by 
the Court (with the exception of Justice Thomas).101 Thus, if a state 
permits collateral review of state criminal convictions on the ground that 
the conviction contravened state constitutional law principles, then, at a 
minimum, the state courts must be equally open to collateral relief based 
 
97 See supra note 22. 
98 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218 (1988)). 
99 292 U.S. 230 (1934). 
100 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
101 In Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 742 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting), Justice 
Thomas, in a portion of his opinion in which he wrote only for himself, maintained that state 
jurisdictional limits are valid even if they discriminate against federal claims. In the portion 
of the opinion joined by the other dissenting Justices, he argued that state jurisdictional 
limits are valid so long as they do not discriminate against federal claims. See id. at 775.  
 The Virginia Supreme Court appears to have overlooked this nondiscrimination principle 
in a recent decision by holding that a new substantive rule of federal law cannot be raised via 
a motion to vacate a sentence because a motion to vacate “is not a state collateral-review 
proceeding ‘open to a claim controlled by federal law,’” even though such motions are 
available in Virginia to correct a sentence that contravenes a state statute. Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 719 (Va. 2017) (quoting Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731–
32), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-1337 (U.S. May 3, 2017). 
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on analogous principles of federal constitutional law. State jurisdictional 
limits may be relied on as a “valid excuse” for declining to entertain a 
federal claim,102 but a rule that discriminates against federal law is not a 
valid excuse. 
In the view of the other Justices who dissented in Haywood, this 
nondiscrimination principle is the only limit imposed by the Supremacy 
Clause on the states’ ability to exclude federal claims from the 
jurisdiction of their courts.103 On this view, the constitutional inquiry 
would focus on whether the state courts have jurisdiction over 
“analogous” state law claims. What would count as an analogous state 
law claim for the other Haywood dissenters is not entirely clear. Would 
a state court be required to entertain a collateral claim based on a “new” 
substantive rule of federal constitutional law if it has jurisdiction over 
any state constitutional claim? Or would it have to entertain such a claim 
only if its courts are open to collateral review of “new” substantive rules 
of state constitutional law? What if the state does not recognize the 
retroactive effect of new state rules of substantive law? 
The Court obviated these questions in Haywood v. Drown. At issue in 
Haywood was New York legislation that converted all scope-of-
employment damages claims against state corrections officers into 
claims against the state itself. Given that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court not to create a right of action against 
states, the (unintentional) result of the New York law was to foreclose 
state-court jurisdiction over § 1983 damages claims against corrections 
officers. The state argued that its legislation (enacted before the 
Supreme Court foreclosed § 1983 suits against states) was neutral, and 
thus a “valid excuse” for dismissing the § 1983 claim. The Court 
rejected the argument, however, holding that “[e]nsuring equality of 
treatment is . . . the beginning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause 
analysis.”104 “Although the absence of discrimination is necessary to our 
finding a state law neutral, it is not sufficient.”105 “[E]quality of 
treatment does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral rule 
 
102 See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392–93 (quoting Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 
279 U.S. 377, 388 (1929)). 
103 See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 775 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 739 (majority opinion). 
105 Id. 
COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
932 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:905 
 
of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse for refusing to 
entertain a federal cause of action.”106 
The foregoing statements in Haywood suggest that the Supremacy 
Clause does more than simply bar discrimination against federal claims. 
But the Court was equivocal about whether a state court’s obligation to 
entertain a federal claim turns on whether it has jurisdiction over 
“analogous” state-law claims. In holding that the New York 
jurisdictional limitation contravened the Supremacy Clause, the Court 
stated that the case “[did] not require [it] to decide whether Congress 
may compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state 
law, to hear suits brought pursuant to § 1983.”107 “New York has made 
this inquiry unnecessary by creating courts of general jurisdiction that 
routinely sit to hear analogous § 1983 actions.”108 As the Court 
described its holding: “[H]aving made the decision to create courts of 
general jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous suits, New 
York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it 
considers at odds with its local policy.”109 Thus, narrowly viewed, 
Haywood establishes that an “analogous” state-law claim need not be 
“identical” to the federal claim.110 The Court deemed actions against 
police officers for damages and actions against corrections officers for 
declaratory or injunctive relief (both permitted by New York law) to be 
sufficiently analogous to damages actions against corrections officers 
(which were not permitted). Because the state courts had jurisdiction 
over the first two types of actions, it could not validly deny its courts 
jurisdiction over federal claims of the third type, regardless of its reasons 
for doing so.111 
 
106 Id. at 738. 
107 Id. at 739. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 740. 
110 Id. at 740 n.6 (“While we have looked to State’s ‘common-law tort analogues’ in 
deciding whether a state procedural rule is neutral . . . we have never equated ‘analogous 
claims’ with ‘identical claims.’”). 
111 The Court described its holding in narrow terms in responding to “the dissent’s fear that 
‘no state jurisdictional rule will be upheld as constitutional.’” Id. at 741 (quoting id. at 769–
70 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). The majority stated that “[o]ur holding addresses only the 
unique scheme adopted by the State of New York—a law designed to shield a particular 
class of defendants (correction officers) from a particular type of liability (damages) brought 
by a particular class of plaintiffs (prisoners).” Id. at 741–42. 
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The foregoing analysis tells us that, if the state courts have 
jurisdiction to grant collateral relief on other grounds, a law denying 
state courts jurisdiction over collateral claims based on “new” rules 
would not qualify as a “valid excuse” that would validate a state court’s 
refusal to entertain a collateral claim based on a new substantive rule of 
federal constitutional law. Jurisdiction to grant collateral relief of any 
kind would probably be considered sufficiently analogous to the former 
claims under the Haywood majority’s analysis. But it is less clear that a 
law denying state courts jurisdiction over all collateral claims would fail 
to qualify as a “valid excuse.” 
In our view, however, the better reading of Haywood is as holding 
that the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to grant collateral relief 
to state prisoners whose continued incarceration contravenes a new rule 
falling within a Teague exception—even if the state’s courts otherwise 
lack jurisdiction over any and all collateral claims. Although the Court 
did not expressly reject the idea that a state court must entertain federal 
claims only if it has jurisdiction to entertain “analogous” claims under 
state law, its view of what counts as an “analogous” claim was so broad 
as to effectively read that restriction out of the Testa line of cases. 
The Court in Haywood struck down New York’s jurisdictional 
limitation barring damages actions against corrections officers not just 
because its courts regularly entertained damage actions against police 
officers and actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
corrections officers, but also because “New York’s constitution vests the 
state supreme courts with general original jurisdiction . . . and the 
‘inviolate authority to hear and resolve all causes in law and equity.’”112 
If general jurisdiction over “all causes in law” is sufficiently 
“analogous” to § 1983 damage claims against corrections officials, then 
general jurisdiction over causes “in equity” should be sufficiently 
“analogous” to actions seeking release from incarceration brought by 
prisoners whose continued incarceration has been rendered illegal by a 
new rule that is retroactively applicable under Teague. Collateral review 
 
112 Id. at 739 (quoting Pollicina v. Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr., 624 N.E.2d 974, 977 
(N.Y. 1993)).  
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of a criminal conviction is, after all, at least analogous to a suit for 
prospective relief from continued incarceration.113 
The Supreme Court itself recognized this analogy in Ex parte Young, 
where it cited the many federal habeas cases against state custodians as 
precedents supporting the jurisdiction of federal courts against state 
officers for prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal 
constitutional rights.114 The difference between a habeas action and an 
action for injunctive relief is almost purely formal, and, as the Court 
stressed in Haywood, “the Supremacy Clause cannot be evaded by 
formalism.”115 
Thus, although the Court in Haywood concluded that a state court 
must entertain federal claims only if it has jurisdiction over “analogous” 
state-law claims, it defined “analogous” very broadly. Federal claims for 
damages must be entertained if the state has courts of general 
jurisdiction empowered to entertain actions “at law.” It follows that 
federal claims for prospective relief must be entertained as long as the 
state has courts of general jurisdiction empowered to entertain suits “in 
equity.” This condition of the state courts’ obligation to entertain federal 
claims would appear to always be met, except perhaps when the federal 
 
113 See generally Erica Hashimoto, Reclaiming the Equitable Heritage of Habeas, 108 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 139, 142 (2014). 
114 The Court drew the analogy between the two types of actions in rejecting the claim that 
the latter suits were barred by the Eleventh Amendment: 
This supreme authority, which arises from the specific provisions of the Constitution 
itself, is nowhere more fully illustrated than in the series of decisions under the 
Federal habeas corpus statute . . . in some of which cases persons in the custody of 
state officers for alleged crimes against the State have been taken from that custody 
and discharged by a Federal court or judge, because the imprisonment was adjudged 
to be in violation of the Federal Constitution. The right to so discharge has not been 
doubted by this court, and it has never been supposed there was any suit against the 
State by reason of serving the writ upon one of the officers of the State in whose 
custody the person was found. . . .  
It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the distinction which, while admitting that the 
taking of such a person from the custody of the State by virtue of service of the writ 
on the state officer in whose custody he is found is not a suit against the State, and yet 
service of a writ on the Attorney General, to prevent his enforcing an unconstitutional 
enactment of a State legislature, is a suit against the State. 
209 U.S. 123, 167–68 (1908) (citations omitted). 
115 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 742. 
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claim is of such a novel character that it could not be described as 
analogous to an action at law or in equity. 
In thus effectively abandoning the requirement of an “analogous” 
state law claim, the Court in Haywood was following through on the 
implications of the rationale of the Testa line of cases. The Court’s 
holdings in these cases were at bottom based on the proposition that, by 
virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the policies underlying federal law are 
not “foreign” to the states. As Justice Black wrote for the Court in Testa, 
“a state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of 
the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom 
on the part of Congress . . . .’”116 “The suggestion that [an] act of 
Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore 
that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite 
inadmissible, because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does 
not exist.”117 
It follows, the Court concluded in Haywood, that “a State cannot 
employ a jurisdictional rule ‘to dissociate [itself] from federal law 
because of disagreement with its content. . . .’”118 As the Court put the 
point in Testa, “[federal] policy is as much the policy of [the states] as if 
it had emanated from its own legislature, and should be respected 
accordingly in the courts of the state.”119 To that end, the Court 
concluded in Haywood that a state law that denies its courts jurisdiction 
over all damage claims against corrections officials, whether based on 
federal or state law, reflects the state’s judgment that such officials 
should not be subjected to damage liability—a policy at odds with the 
federal policy reflected in § 1983. Similarly, it seems to us that a state 
law that denies its courts jurisdiction to grant collateral relief to a state 
prisoner, whether on federal or state grounds, reflects a policy that 
criminal convictions should not be disturbed once “final.” Such a policy, 
if applied to claims falling within a Teague exception, would be at odds 
 
116 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (quoting Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. 
Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916)). 
117 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736 (quoting Second Emp’rs’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 57 
(1912)). 
118 Id. (quoting Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990)). 
119 Testa, 330 U.S. at 392 (quoting Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 
U.S. 1, 57 (1912)). 
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with the federal policy articulated in Teague, as interpreted in 
Montgomery. For this reason alone, it would not be a “valid excuse.” 
This rationale for the Testa principle means that a jurisdictional 
limitation can be a “valid excuse” for rejecting a federal claim only if it 
does not turn on the content of the law over which the courts are being 
denied jurisdiction. If a state denies its courts all jurisdiction over a 
particular class of claim, it is likely that that the state does not recognize 
the existence of such a claim as a matter of state law. If federal law 
recognizes the particular class of claim, the nonexistence of the claim as 
a matter of state law reflects a state policy in conflict with the relevant 
federal policy. 
The Court’s explanation of the basis of its holding in Testa and 
Haywood therefore must mean that a state’s jurisdictional limit would 
count as a “neutral” rule of administration, and thus a “valid excuse,” 
only if it does not exclude a particular substantive class of cases from 
the jurisdiction of the state’s courts. Examples of such neutral rules 
would include a rule excluding cases in which the dispute or the parties 
lack a sufficient connection with the state,120 or a rule that directed 
certain types of claims to one state tribunal instead of another.121 We 
discuss some possible limitations that might constitute “valid excuses” 
in Part III, below. But a jurisdictional rule would not be neutral if it 
reflects hostility to a particular type of claim recognized by federal law. 
A state law denying its courts jurisdiction over all collateral claims 
would, it seems to us, reflect hostility to the right to collateral relief 
recognized by the Court in Montgomery. 
b. The Crain Principle 
In the present context, the Testa line of cases dovetails with a separate 
line of Supremacy Clause cases establishing that state laws are invalid 
insofar as they deny state courts of general jurisdiction the power to 
grant remedies required by the Constitution. Indeed, the latter principle 
is even more directly on point than the former. The Testa/Haywood line 
of cases involved federal statutory causes of action. But the holding of 
Montgomery was that state prisoners are constitutionally entitled to 
 
120 See Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York, 
New Haven & Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). 
121 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). 
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collateral relief if their continued incarceration contravenes a new 
substantive rule of constitutional law. The conclusion that the state 
courts must entertain federal claims, subject only to neutral rules of 
administration that do not reflect hostility to the right, stands on an even 
stronger footing when the federal claimant seeks a constitutionally 
required remedy. 
The Court in Haywood framed the issue as concerning the power of 
Congress, by creating a federal cause of action, to compel states to offer 
a forum for the adjudication of claims over which those courts would not 
otherwise have jurisdiction.122 The dissenters in Haywood similarly 
understood the issue to concern the scope of congressional power to 
commandeer state courts.123 When a constitutionally required remedy is 
at stake, however, the reasons for insisting on the power and duty of 
state courts to entertain the claim are even more powerful. After all, 
when Congress creates a cause of action, it has a strong incentive to set 
up an adequate judicial enforcement mechanism. If state courts are 
unavailable because of a state jurisdictional limitation, Congress can, 
and presumably would, invest the federal courts with jurisdiction over 
such claims. Constitutionally required remedies, however, should be 
available even if Congress does not support such remedies strongly 
enough to give the federal courts the jurisdiction to award them. 
A separate line of Supreme Court decisions supports the conclusion 
that state courts are constitutionally required to entertain suits seeking 
constitutionally required remedies for violations of federal law, 
regardless of whether they have jurisdiction under state law to adjudicate 
analogous suits. The leading case is General Oil Co. v. Crain. The 
plaintiff in Crain brought suit against a Tennessee official seeking to 
enjoin the enforcement of a Tennessee law it claimed was 
unconstitutional. The Tennessee court dismissed the suit for lack of 
jurisdiction, relying on a Tennessee statute providing 
[t]hat no court in the state of Tennessee has, nor shall hereafter have, 
any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit against the 
 
122 See Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739 (“This case does not require us to decide whether 
Congress may compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law, to hear 
suits brought pursuant to § 1983.”).  
123 See id. at 770 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 
(1997)); id. at 773 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).  
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[s]tate, or any officer acting by the authority of the [s]tate, with a view 
to reach the [s]tate, its treasury, funds, or property, and all such suits 
now pending, or hereafter brought, should be dismissed . . . .
124
 
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the 
state court’s decision rested on an adequate and independent state law 
ground, namely, the state court’s lack of jurisdiction over suits against 
state officials. Only Justice Harlan agreed with this argument.125 In 
determining whether a state law may be relied upon as an adequate and 
independent state ground precluding Supreme Court appellate review, 
the Court held, “to give adequate protection to constitutional rights a 
distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws.”126 The 
Tennessee law denying its courts jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin 
enforcement of an unconstitutional law was, in the circumstances of the 
case, invalid. “It being . . . the right of a party to be protected against a 
law which violates a constitutional right . . . it is manifest that a decision 
which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is 
reviewable by this court.”127 
Crain thus held that, if a plaintiff has a constitutional right to 
injunctive relief, a state law denying its courts jurisdiction to entertain an 
action seeking such relief was itself unconstitutional. The Court 
concluded that the state court had an obligation to entertain a suit 
seeking that constitutionally required remedy whether or not state law 
authorized it to do so. Indeed, the state court had an obligation to 
entertain the action and grant the requested relief even in the face of a 
state statute explicitly denying it the power to do so. 
*    *    * 
In sum, under both the Testa and Crain lines of cases, we believe that 
state courts are constitutionally obligated to entertain claims by state 
prisoners seeking the collateral remedy the Court in Montgomery held to 
be constitutionally required, even if they lack the jurisdiction to entertain 
such claims under state law. State jurisdictional rules may validly assign 
jurisdiction over such claims to specific state courts, and states may 
 
124 Crain, 209 U.S. at 216. 
125 Id. at 232–34 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
126 Id. at 226 (majority opinion). 
127 Id. at 228. 
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impose neutral rules of administration, such as statutes of limitations, so 
long as those rules do not themselves violate constitutional rights. (We 
discuss the permissibility of some such rules in Part III.) But some court 
in each state must be open to such claims for at least some reasonable 
period. 
2. Collateral Relief for State Prisoners in Federal Court 
As with other constitutionally required remedies, Congress may 
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to grant collateral relief to state 
prisoners, and it may even provide that the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts to grant such relief shall be exclusive. Montgomery itself 
confirms that Congress has not made the federal courts’ jurisdiction to 
grant collateral relief to state prisoners on the basis of new rules of 
federal law exclusive—a conclusion that necessarily followed from 
Danforth. 
The question is whether state prisoners additionally have a 
constitutional right to collateral relief in federal court if their continued 
incarceration contravenes a retroactively applicable new rule of federal 
law. Current federal statutes arguably raise this constitutional question. 
Federal statutes give the lower federal courts habeas jurisdiction over 
some claims by state prisoners, but it is unclear whether these statutes 
authorize the federal courts to grant habeas relief to state prisoners in 
this situation. Indeed, the Court has expressly left open whether the 
federal habeas statutes, as amended in AEDPA, “bar a federal habeas 
petitioner from relying on a decision that came after the last state-court 
adjudication on the merits, but [falls] within one of the exceptions 
recognized in Teague.”128 
Some scholars have argued that AEDPA is unconstitutional to the 
extent it precludes federal courts from awarding collateral relief to state 
prisoners incarcerated in contravention of new substantive rules of 
constitutional law.129 But this conclusion runs into another widely held 
view—that is, that “federal habeas corpus [is] constitutionally gratuitous 
as a means of postconviction review.”130 This proposition is thought to 
 
128 Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 n.* (2011). 
129 See Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 73, at 45–46. 
130 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 55, at 1813 (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 
75, 93–94 (1807)). 
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follow from the Madisonian Compromise, under which the Constitution 
left it to Congress to determine whether to create lower federal courts in 
the first place. From the premise that the lower federal courts exist only 
at Congress’s pleasure, it is widely understood to follow that the 
jurisdiction of such courts is entirely within Congress’s control. Thus, in 
Ex parte Bollman, the Supreme Court concluded that the power of the 
federal courts to grant habeas relief must be granted by written law: 
“[C]ourts which are created by written law and whose jurisdiction is 
defined by written law cannot transcend that jurisdiction.”131 
The scope of Congress’s power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts is the subject of much debate.132 This is not the place to review 
the contending positions. It suffices to note that the prevailing view is 
that Article III is satisfied if the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to 
review state court decisions denying a federal right.133 As discussed in 
the previous section, the state courts have the power and obligation to 
grant collateral relief to state prisoners based on new substantive rules of 
constitutional law, and, if they fail to do so, the U.S. Supreme Court 
may review and reverse their decisions. Congress may confer exclusive 
jurisdiction over such claims upon the lower federal courts, but it has not 
done so. Under the prevailing interpretation of Article III, if the 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review state court decisions 
adjudicating a state prisoner’s right to the remedy recognized in 
Montgomery, the Constitution does not require that the lower federal 
courts also be empowered to grant that remedy. 
There are certainly good reasons for Congress to confer jurisdiction 
on the federal courts to entertain petitions from state prisoners seeking 
the remedy recognized in Montgomery. We also think there are strong 
arguments for interpreting current statutes to grant the federal courts 
 
131 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93. 
132 For a review of the various positions, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 30, at 295–341. 
133 The position that some federal court must have jurisdiction to entertain federal 
constitutional claims is defended by, inter alia, Akhil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of 
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 206 
(1985), and Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term—Foreword: 
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 21–22 (1981). Others argue that Article III places no limits on 
Congress’s power to exclude federal issues from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, 
e.g., Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005–06 
(1965). 
COPYRIGHT © 2017 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2017] Constitutional Right to Collateral Review 941 
 
such jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in light of our conclusion that state 
prisoners have a constitutional right to a remedy in state court for a 
claim based upon a new rule of substantive constitutional law, it is 
difficult to conclude that the Constitution entitles state prisoners to an 
additional opportunity to enforce such a claim in the lower federal 
courts. 
B. Federal Prisoners 
Federal prisoners of course have the same constitutional right to 
collateral relief for incarcerations that contravene new rules of 
substantive federal constitutional law as do state prisoners. Thus, 
Montgomery raises the same question for federal prisoners that we 
discussed above with respect to state prisoners: does the Constitution 
require that this remedy be available in the federal courts or in the state 
courts? Although the Court has never expressly resolved whether the 
Teague framework (including its nonretroactivity principle) applies in 
general to claims brought by federal prisoners under Section 2255,134 it 
recently reaffirmed in Welch v. United States that federal prisoners are 
statutorily entitled to habeas relief if their continued incarceration 
contravenes a new rule falling within Teague’s “substantive” 
exception.135 (In Welch, the question was whether the Court’s decision in 
Johnson v. United States, invalidating part of a federal criminal statute 
on Fifth Amendment vagueness grounds,136 was “substantive.”) In this 
Section, we consider whether federal prisoners are constitutionally 
entitled to collateral relief in federal court on this ground. We conclude 
that federal prisoners are constitutionally entitled to this relief in the 
state courts unless Congress has given the federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction to grant such relief. 
 
134 See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 357 n.16 (2013) (reserving the 
question whether “Teague’s bar on retroactivity does not apply when a petitioner challenges 
a federal conviction, or at least does not do so when she makes a claim of ineffective 
assistance”); Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2008) (reserving “whether the 
Teague rule applies to cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 327 n.1 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court “does not address the 
question whether the rule it announces today extends to claims brought by federal, as well as 
state, prisoners”). 
135 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016). 
136 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–58 (2015). 
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The case for concluding that federal courts must, as a constitutional 
matter, be empowered to grant collateral post-conviction relief to 
prisoners whose continued incarceration contravenes new substantive 
rules of constitutional law is, in our view, stronger for federal prisoners 
than for state prisoners. For state prisoners, there is no impediment to 
state courts granting the constitutionally required collateral relief, and 
the Supreme Court can exercise appellate review of state court decisions 
denying them such relief. 
The same may not be true with respect to federal prisoners. In 
Tarble’s Case, the Supreme Court held that state courts lack the power 
to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal jailers.137 If state courts are 
constitutionally unable to grant federal prisoners the constitutionally 
required collateral relief, then the Supreme Court may very well lack the 
power to grant such relief on appeal from state court decisions 
dismissing such applications. (If the state court correctly dismisses such 
a claim for lack of jurisdiction, presumably the Supreme Court’s only 
option if it reviews the decision is to affirm.) If some federal court must 
have jurisdiction (either original or appellate) to grant this form of relief, 
and if the state courts lack such jurisdiction as a constitutional matter, 
then it must follow that, notwithstanding the Madisonian Compromise, 
the Constitution confers such jurisdiction on the lower federal courts.138 
In the view of some scholars, the constitutional need for review of 
illegal federal detentions, and the inability of the state courts to afford 
such review, explains the Court’s holding in Boumediene v. Bush that a 
federal statute depriving the lower federal courts of jurisdiction over 
habeas petitions from Guantánamo detainees violated the Suspension 
Clause.139 
We think that the reports of the death of the Madisonian Compromise 
are premature. Such analyses rely at bottom on an interpretation of 
 
137 Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 409 (1872). 
138 Persons convicted after a criminal trial, unlike persons in executive detention, would 
also be able to obtain the constitutionally required remedy through an original writ of habeas 
corpus in the Supreme Court. We discuss this third avenue for obtaining the relief 
contemplated by Montgomery below. See infra note 143. 
139 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). See Mulligan, supra note 29. See also 
Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdicition of 
Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 108–
09 (1975) (drawing a similar conclusion from Tarble’s Case). 
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Tarble’s Case as holding that state courts are constitutionally disabled 
from granting habeas relief to federal prisoners. But, as the authors of 
the third edition of Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System memorably asked: “Why should the dubious tail of 
Tarble’s Case wag such a large dog?”140 In other words, if a 
constitutional reading of Tarble’s Case is inconsistent with the 
Madisonian Compromise, wouldn’t it be far more reasonable for the 
former to give way than the latter? 
Indeed, a non-constitutional interpretation of Tarble’s Case is readily 
available: Congress had given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to 
grant habeas relief against federal officials, and the Court in Tarble’s 
Case relied on the existence of such jurisdiction to reassure the reader 
that its holding provided “no just ground to apprehend that the liberty of 
the citizen will thereby be endangered.”141 Tarble’s Case is thus best 
understood as an “implied exclusion” case, where the ouster of state 
court jurisdiction was inferred from the existence of federal jurisdiction. 
So construed, Tarble’s Case might well have come out differently had it 
been decided at a time when there were no lower federal courts, or when 
those courts lacked jurisdiction over habeas petitions like Tarble’s.142 
 
140 Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 491 
(3d ed. 1988). See also id. (describing Tarble’s Case as “meandering and poorly reasoned”); 
Henry L. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 507 
(1954) (describing Tarble’s Case as a “case of doubtful soundness” in which the Court 
“discovered in the silence of Congress, or in the Constitution itself, an implied exclusion of 
the state courts”). 
141 Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. at 411. 
142 One of us has argued in some detail that the best way to understand the relationship 
between habeas corpus and the Madisonian Compromise is to appreciate the unique power 
of the federal courts in and for the District of Columbia—at least until 1970—to issue 
common-law writs to federal officers. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way 
Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District of Columbia, 12 Green Bag 2d 71 (2008); see also 
United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702, 713 (C.C.D.D.C. 1837) (No. 15,517) 
(discussing uniqueness of D.C. Circuit), aff’d, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). Unlike the 
contemporary Article III courts, which required affirmative legislation to be vested with the 
authority to issue writs of habeas corpus, the D.C. local courts exercised such power at 
common law, and only lost such power when Congress affirmatively took it away in 1970. 
See D.C. Code § 16-1901(b) (1970) (taking away the pre-1970 jurisdiction).  
 This analysis converges with the reading of Tarble’s Case offered in the text, leading us to 
the same conclusion. Although the local D.C. territorial courts exercised common law 
jurisdiction, they existed at all only because Congress created them. If Congress had not 
created them, the residual common law jurisdiction they exercised would have been 
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We think that Boumediene, too, is best understood as resting on 
Congress’s implied exclusion of state jurisdiction. Upon invalidating 
Congress’s limitation of the federal courts’ jurisdiction over habeas 
claims by Guantánamo detainees, the Court corrected the problem by 
empowering the lower federal courts to grant the constitutionally 
required relief rather than authorizing the state courts to do so. We think 
this (implicit) choice was based on the Court’s reasonable assumption 
that Congress would have preferred that any constitutionally required 
remedy for federal detainees be sought in the federal rather than the state 
courts. Indeed, we think that it can safely be assumed that Congress 
would have this preference for all challenges to the actions of federal 
officers. 
As applied to the constitutionally required collateral remedy 
recognized in Montgomery, this understanding of Tarble’s Case and 
Boumediene would tell us that the remedy is available as a default matter 
in the state courts. But the default remedy would be the appropriate 
remedy only if Congress either failed to create lower federal courts or 
clearly expressed its preference that the remedy be available in the state 
courts. Otherwise, as Tarble’s Case and Boumediene suggest, the federal 
statutes regulating the jurisdiction of the federal courts will be construed 
to authorize the lower federal courts to grant any constitutionally 
required remedy against federal officials—to the exclusion of state 
courts. In short, the default remedy as a constitutional matter is in the 
state courts, but because Congress is highly unlikely to want state courts 
to be reviewing federal detentions, the courts will apply a strong 
presumption, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the federal 
courts have jurisdiction to grant any constitutionally required remedy 
against federal officials.143 
 
exercised by the Maryland (or Virginia) courts that operated in the capital region, pre-
cession. See Vladeck, supra, at 75–76 & n.13. Thus, here too, the default courts available to 
provide the relief required by the Constitution, had Congress never created federal courts and 
endowed them with exclusive jurisdiction, would have been state courts.  
143 In the case of federal prisoners who were convicted in federal court but whose 
continued incarceration contravenes new substantive rules, there is a third possibility: the 
Supreme Court would be able to grant habeas relief to such prisoners under its original 
habeas jurisdiction. In such cases, Supreme Court review could be regarded as appellate 
rather than original for Article III purposes. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 n.1 
(1996) (Souter, J., concurring). Thus, unlike persons in executive detention, prisoners in 
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*    *    * 
We emerge from this doctrinal thicket with two distinct—but 
related—conclusions: first, for state prisoners, the constitutional right to 
a post-conviction remedy for the enforcement of new rules of 
substantive constitutional law is one that must be provided, in the first 
instance, by state courts. Although AEDPA is best read to have 
preserved the federal courts’ power to afford such relief as well, it is 
clear that Congress did not intend to give the federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction to grant relief to state prisoners on the basis of new rules. 
Second, for federal prisoners, although state courts are also the 
Constitution’s default forum for obtaining such relief, we think the 
Court’s decisions in Tarble’s Case and Boumediene are best understood 
to reflect the (undoubtedly correct) assumption that Congress would 
prefer any constitutionally required remedy against federal officials to 
be available in the federal courts rather than the state courts. As long as 
lower federal courts exist, they should be presumed to have exclusive 
jurisdiction to grant any constitutionally required remedy against federal 
officials. The default forum under the Constitution would become 
available once more only if Congress denied the lower federal courts 
jurisdiction and clearly expressed its preference that the remedy be 
available in the state courts. In the absence of such a clear statement, the 
Court should construe the federal habeas statute to authorize the lower 
federal courts to afford the constitutionally required collateral relief 
recognized in Montgomery. 
 
custody pursuant to criminal convictions would not be constitutionally limited to review in 
the state courts or the lower federal courts.  
 But Congress is unlikely to want such review to be available solely in the Supreme Court 
rather than the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court’s time and resources are limited; 
assigning to the Court the responsibility to entertain the habeas petitions of federal prisoners 
raising claims based on new substantive rules of constitutional law would not be a wise 
allocation of federal judicial resources. Faced with the choice of allowing such review in the 
lower federal courts or in the Supreme Court, it is safe to assume that Congress would have 
preferred such review to be available in the lower federal courts. The same rule of statutory 
construction that justifies an interpretation of the statutes involved in Tarble’s Case and 
Boumediene as permitting review in the lower federal courts in preference to the state courts 
would justify an interpretation of the statutes regulating federal habeas review as permitting 
the constitutionally required review of the claims of federal prisoners to occur in the lower 
federal courts instead of (or in addition to) in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE  
CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPELLED REMEDY 
In Part I, we explained how Montgomery recognized the 
constitutional basis of the first Teague v. Lane exception. In Part II, we 
demonstrated why that result, when taken together with the Supreme 
Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, compels the conclusion that 
state and federal prisoners alike have a constitutional right to a collateral 
post-conviction remedy where, based upon new substantive rules of 
constitutional law, their continued incarceration is no longer lawful. In 
this Part, we turn to some of the broader implications of Montgomery’s 
recognition of a constitutionally required collateral remedy. Because the 
takeaway from Parts I and II is potentially so momentous, it is 
impossible to sketch out all of the potential implications that arise from 
reading Montgomery together with the Supreme Court’s Supremacy 
Clause jurisprudence. Instead, our effort here is to identify and offer 
some preliminary thoughts about what we see as some of the more 
important key issues. 
A. The Types of Claims for Which Prisoners Are Entitled to Collateral 
Relief 
As Part I demonstrated, the Court in Montgomery held that prisoners 
are entitled to collateral relief based on new substantive rules of 
constitutional law. The core case is one that seeks collateral relief based 
on a new rule that “places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to 
proscribe.’”144 An example would be the new rule recognized by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Texas v. Johnson, holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits punishment for burning the American flag.145 In 
addition, the Court has held that the Teague exception for new 
substantive rules applies to new “rules prohibiting a certain category of 
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or 
offense.”146 Montgomery involved a new substantive rule of this type. 
 
144 Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
145 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
146 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989). 
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The Court in Teague recognized a second category of new rules 
exempt from the bar on retroactive application: “watershed” procedural 
rules, defined as “those new procedures without which the likelihood of 
an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”147 The Court in Teague 
expressed the belief that it was “unlikely that many such components of 
basic due process have yet to emerge.”148 And, indeed, the Court has yet 
to recognize a new procedural rule as falling within this category. If the 
Justices should ever identify a new rule falling into this category, we 
believe the Montgomery holding would extend to such rules as well. 
After all, they rest on the same basic premise from Justice Harlan’s 
Desist and Mackey opinions—that the new rule vitiates the basis for the 
prisoner’s incarceration. 
With respect to federal prisoners, the “substantive” category applies 
to new decisions interpreting criminal statutes in a way that narrows the 
range of conduct the statute makes criminal. For example, the Court in 
Bousley v. United States149 held that its earlier decision in Bailey 
v. United States,150 interpreting the term “use” in the law making it a 
crime to use a firearm in certain circumstances, was retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review. Persons who are not guilty of 
the offense as narrowed by the new decision are entitled to collateral 
relief. 
With respect to state prisoners, a similar question arises as to whether 
they are entitled to collateral relief on the basis of new substantive rules 
of state law. In other words, does the federal Constitution entitle them to 
collateral relief if the state’s highest court subsequently rules that the 
statute under which the prisoner was convicted contravenes the state 
constitution or does not criminalize the conduct the prisoner was found 
to have committed? Examination of this question helps shed light on the 
basis and scope of the Court’s holding in Montgomery. Montgomery 
establishes that the retroactivity of new substantive rules of federal law 
is based on the federal Constitution, but the Court did not explain which 
provision of the Constitution requires such retroactive application. Does 
the federal Constitution also require the retroactive application of new 
 
147 Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. 
148 Id.  
149 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998). 
150 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). 
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substantive rules of state law, or is the retroactivity of such rules purely 
a matter of state law? 
The issue was teed up but ultimately avoided in Fiore v. White.151 
Petitioner William Fiore was convicted of violating a Pennsylvania 
statute making it a crime to operate a hazardous waste facility without a 
permit. After Fiore’s conviction became final, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Fiore’s business partner, 
David Scarpone, who was convicted of performing the same acts at the 
same time. The state court held that the statute did not apply to the 
conduct. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania courts refused to afford Fiore 
collateral relief. Fiore then sought federal habeas relief, arguing that 
failure to give him the benefit of the new decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause. The district court 
granted the writ, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the “state 
courts are under no [federal] constitutional obligation to apply their 
decisions retroactively.”152 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 
but, before reaching the merits, asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
to clarify whether its decision in the Scarpone case articulated a new 
rule of law or instead correctly stated the law as it existed at the time of 
Fiore’s conviction.153 The Pennsylvania court responded that its earlier 
decision had not announced a new rule of law, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Fiore was entitled to habeas relief under Jackson v. 
Virginia,154 which establishes that a conviction violates the Due Process 
Clause if not supported by evidence establishing the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.155 
Because the Pennsylvania court had clarified that its later decision 
was retroactively applicable as a matter of state law, the Supreme Court 
did not have to decide whether the U.S. Constitution requires state 
courts to give retroactive effect to judicial decisions on substantive 
questions of state law. We think the answer to that question turns on the 
source and scope of the constitutional right the Court recognized in 
Teague, and hence of the remedy recognized in Montgomery. 
 
151 531 U.S. 225, 226 (2001). 
152 Fiore v. White, 149 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1998). 
153 Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 25 (1999). 
154 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). 
155 See Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228–29. 
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On our view, the Teague exception for new substantive rules of 
constitutional law rests at bottom on the Court’s understanding of the 
nature of the role of the federal courts in interpreting constitutional or 
statutory provisions addressing primary conduct. There are (at least) two 
possible ways to understand the “retroactive” effect of new judicial 
interpretations of substantive law. The first approach is to understand 
such decisions as telling us that the law has always meant what the 
Court now says it means. Thus, the prior decisions interpreting the 
provision differently and denying the prisoner relief were erroneous 
from the start. This view seems most consistent with the Court’s 
description of these new rules as having “retroactive” effect; applying 
the new rule “retroactively” is correcting an historical error, and not 
simply rendering a forward-looking judgment. 
Alternatively, we might understand a court’s decision adopting a new 
interpretation as placing new limits on the power of government to 
impose punishment for certain types of conduct. On this view, the new 
decision does not call into question the correctness of the earlier judicial 
decision when rendered (or the state’s incarceration of the prisoner up 
until the time the new decision was rendered). But the new interpretation 
does deny the state the power to continue to punish the prisoner for 
having performed the acts he was found to have performed. On this 
second understanding of the effect of a new judicial decision, the court 
awarding collateral relief is not really giving the new interpretation 
“retroactive” effect; it is merely recognizing that the state no longer 
possesses the power to punish the prisoner. So construed, the Teague 
exception gives prospective effect to the new interpretation by ordering 
the prisoner’s release from what is, from that point forward, illegal 
detention. That the Court understands the effect of a new interpretation 
of substantive federal law in this second way is suggested by its 
description of its holding as being based on the idea that the state “may 
not constitutionally insist that a prisoner remain in jail,”156 as well as its 
statement that, “when a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred 
by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, 
unlawful.”157 
 
156 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (emphasis added). 
157 Id. at 729–30 (emphasis added). 
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The second rationale for entitling the prisoner to the benefit of the 
new interpretation is more plausible for new constitutional decisions 
than for new interpretations narrowing the substantive scope of criminal 
statutes. With respect to new constitutional interpretations, Montgomery 
may reflect the Court’s recognition that there is a fundamental 
unfairness, perhaps of due process ramifications, in continuing to 
incarcerate an individual for conduct that the state no longer possesses 
the power to proscribe. With respect to new interpretations narrowing 
the scope of a federal statute, however, the second rationale would 
appear to require the conclusion that a prisoner is also constitutionally 
entitled to the benefit of the subsequent repeal of the statute she was 
convicted of violating. Although continuing to incarcerate someone for 
violating a statute that has subsequently been repealed may also be 
thought to be unfair, it has never been thought to be unconstitutional.158 
Because the Court appears to regard the holding of Bousley as merely a 
straightforward application of the rule established in Teague, we think 
the first of the two approaches described above is the most persuasive 
conceptualization of the first Teague exception. 
If Montgomery is based on the idea that new judicial interpretations of 
substantive federal law clarify what the substantive law has always 
meant, then its applicability to new state court interpretations of state 
law depends on whether the federal Constitution requires states to regard 
their judiciaries’ new interpretations of state laws in the same way. If 
any provision of the federal Constitution addresses how states must 
understand their courts’ novel interpretations of state law, presumably it 
is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due 
Process Clause undoubtedly imposes some outer limits in this context. 
For example, the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrariness in judicial 
decision-making. This may mean, for example, that a state cannot 
validly give one defendant the benefit of a new constitutional or 
statutory interpretation yet deny the benefit of the new interpretation to 
someone who jointly committed the crime but was tried separately.159 
 
158 See Comment, Today’s Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of 
Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 120, 145 (1972) (“No matter what the 
nature of the change, ameliorative legislation has never been held to apply to finalized 
convictions.”).  
159 Thus, there would have been a strong argument that failure to give Fiore the benefit of 
the new rule recognized in Scarpone’s case would have violated the Due Process Clause. 
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We doubt, however, that the Due Process Clause imposes on the 
states the particular conception of the judicial role in interpreting 
substantive law that underlies the Teague and Montgomery holdings. 
Indeed, the role of the state courts with respect to state law differs 
significantly from the role of the federal courts with respect to federal 
law. Of particular relevance here, the state courts as a matter of course 
engage openly and unapologetically in judicial law-making—for 
example, when they develop their state’s common law. The federal 
courts’ authority to play a law-making role is much more constrained 
and exceptional. We thus think it likely that the states can, consistently 
with the Due Process Clause, conceptualize their courts’ novel 
interpretations of their constitutions or statutes as acts of law-making 
applicable only to primary conduct occurring after the judicial decision 
was rendered. The Due Process Clause limits the states’ freedom not to 
extend the benefits of a new rule to persons convicted earlier in certain 
contexts (such as, we think, on the facts of Fiore v. White),160 but we 
doubt that the Clause imposes a general requirement on the states to give 
retroactive effect to new judicial interpretations of state law, even when 
the new interpretation bears on the permissibility of primary individual 
conduct. 
Of course, a state is free to understand judicial decisions adopting 
new interpretations of state law as the Court in Teague and Montgomery 
understood judicial decisions adopting new interpretations of the 
substantive provisions of the federal Constitution. If a state does regard 
the new judicial interpretations in this way, then Fiore tells us that the 
Due Process Clause requires the state courts to apply those 
interpretations to persons convicted before the interpretations were 
rendered. But whether new judicial interpretations of substantive law are 
retroactively applicable is ordinarily a question of state law not 
reviewable in federal courts. 
B. When Does the Right Accrue? 
The petitioners in both Montgomery and Welch based their (ultimately 
successful) claims on new decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that the 
petitioners in both cases claimed were substantive, although the Court 
 
160 See supra text accompanying note 159. 
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had not yet so held with regard to either. This tells us that the right to 
collateral relief accrues, at the latest, when the Supreme Court 
recognizes a new rule that is retroactively applicable on collateral review 
(even if, as in both cases, it was not self-evident that the new rule so 
qualifies). There is no need to await a Supreme Court decision holding 
that the new rule is retroactively applicable. 
In Teague, the Court held that a prisoner raising a substantive claim 
may ask the habeas court to recognize the substantive right for the first 
time. Thus, the petitioner in Penry v. Lynaugh brought a federal habeas 
petition raising the claim that the Constitution prohibits imposition of 
the death penalty on persons with mental disabilities.161 The Court held 
that this claim fell within the first Teague exception and could thus be 
raised on collateral review.162 However, the Court went on to reject the 
claim on the merits.163 (The Court reversed itself on the latter point in 
Atkins v. Virginia.164) 
After AEDPA, a prisoner would be able to maintain a first federal 
habeas petition seeking the initial recognition of a new substantive rule 
if the claim was not “adjudicated on the merits in state court.”165 As 
discussed in Part II, it is unclear whether the habeas statute as amended 
by AEDPA permits claims based on new rules of any kind if the claim 
was adjudicated on the merits in state court. If AEDPA were read to 
permit claims based upon new rules falling within a Teague exception, 
as we suggest above, it is unclear whether the petitioner would be able to 
ask the habeas court to recognize that right for the first time or would be 
limited to enforcing on habeas a new rule that has already been 
recognized by the Supreme Court. At best, a state prisoner would be able 
to seek initial recognition of a new rule only in his first federal habeas 
petition, and only if the petition was brought within one year of when 
the conviction became final. The statute of limitations trigger for “new 
rules” begins to run on “the date on which the constitutional right 
 
161 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989). 
162 Id. at 329–30. 
163 Id. at 330–40. 
164 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
165 Such a claim would now have to be brought in the petitioner’s first federal habeas 
petition, and it would have to be brought within one year of the date on which the conviction 
became final. 
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asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review.”166 And the authorization for 
raising a claim in a second or successive petition applies only if “the 
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.”167 Thus, claims based on new substantive rules may not be 
raised more than one year after the conviction became final, and may not 
be raised in a second or successive petition if the new rule has not 
already been recognized (and “made retroactive”) by the Supreme 
Court. 
As to collateral claims raised in state court, does Montgomery 
establish that prisoners have the right to seek initial recognition of a 
right falling within the Teague exceptions? We think not. State courts 
must, of course, entertain at trial all properly raised federal claims or 
defenses (both substantive and procedural). If the claim was rejected by 
the court at trial and on direct appeals, the defendant can seek review in 
the Supreme Court. States may permit such claims to be raised again in 
collateral proceedings. But, except in unusual circumstances (such as 
when the claim could not have been raised earlier), we do not think the 
Constitution requires the states to afford state prisoners an opportunity to 
relitigate the substantive claim in collateral proceedings. Just as state 
rules of claim and issue preclusion relegate civil litigants to one shot at 
adjudicating their claims and defenses, states can validly limit criminal 
defendants to a single opportunity to raise even substantive 
constitutional claims. A contrary conclusion would permit endless 
relitigation of claims that were properly rejected under existing federal 
precedents. 
Allowing a state prisoner to seek initial recognition of a new 
substantive rule on federal habeas is justified by the need to afford such 
prisoners at least one realistic shot at a federal forum in which to raise 
the claim. (As noted, the Supreme Court may directly review via 
certiorari the state courts’ denial of federal claims at trial, but the Court 
grants review of very few certiorari petitions. State prisoners cannot be 
said to have a realistic shot at Supreme Court review of their claims via 
 
166 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2012). 
167 Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). 
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certiorari.) But all state prisoners had a realistic opportunity—indeed, a 
right—to have their federal claims adjudicated in the state courts at their 
trials and direct appeals. The Constitution does not give them a right to a 
second opportunity in the state courts. 
The situation is different after the Supreme Court has rendered a new 
substantive decision establishing the validity of the petitioner’s claim for 
the first time. Thus, we think that the right recognized in Montgomery is 
a right to obtain collateral relief in state court for claims based on new 
substantive rules that have been definitively recognized for the first time 
by the Supreme Court after the petitioner’s conviction became final. The 
holding thus rests on the courts’ understanding of the effect of Supreme 
Court decisions recognizing new substantive rules. 
C. Procedural Limitations 
As discussed in Part II, the states may impose neutral procedural 
limitations on the enforcement of federal rights in state court. Such 
procedural rules are valid if they satisfy the requirements of the Due 
Process Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause’s nondiscrimination 
principle. Federal procedural rules, too, must satisfy the Due Process 
Clause. Federal jurisdictional limits that might otherwise raise 
constitutional questions might be deemed valid to the extent federal 
collateral relief is understood to be constitutionally optional. With 
respect to federal prisoners, however, the courts properly presume that 
Congress would prefer collateral review to take place in federal rather 
than state courts. Thus, courts may (and should) assume that, rather than 
rely on the state courts to provide federal prisoners the collateral relief 
required by the Constitution, Congress would prefer that the federal 
habeas statute be construed to authorize the federal courts to afford 
federal prisoners the procedures required by the Due Process Clause. 
1. Statutes of Limitations 
A statute of limitations is an example of such a procedural limitation. 
As noted, the statute of limitations imposed by AEDPA, for both state 
and federal prisoners seeking federal habeas relief, requires that habeas 
claims be raised within one year of the latest of four dates. One of the 
triggering events is the “the date on which the constitutional right 
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 
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been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review.”168 A statute of limitations 
satisfies Due Process if it gives the prisoner “a reasonable opportunity to 
have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined.”169 A statute 
that gives the prisoner one year from the time the right accrues to bring a 
claim based on a new substantive rule of constitutional law would 
appear to satisfy this standard. 
As long as it is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, and affords 
the petitioner enough time, a state statute of limitations can permissibly 
be applied to petitions seeking state collateral review on the basis of new 
substantive rules. Because of the nature of a Montgomery claim, 
however, the Constitution requires that any state statute of limitations 
must, like AEDPA’s, begin to run anew upon the Supreme Court’s 
initial recognition of the new rule (which, as we discussed above, is 
when the right to collateral relief recognized in Montgomery necessarily 
accrues). 
2. Successive Petitions 
AEDPA also placed stringent new limits on the ability of state and 
federal prisoners to present second or successive federal habeas 
petitions. These limits potentially present two significant constitutional 
problems after Montgomery. As discussed below, the courts appear to 
have avoided the first problem through statutory interpretation, but the 
other problem remains significant. 
AEDPA permits the filing of a second or successive federal habeas 
petition170 (by state or federal prisoners) only if, as relevant here, “the 
claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to 
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable.”171 But the petitioner would be able to include only claims 
that were not included in a prior petition, as AEDPA provides 
 
168 Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C). 
169 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955) (quoting Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 
574 (1948)). 
170 With regard to second or successive petitions, § 2255 incorporates the same 
requirements as § 2244. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (“A second or successive motion must be 
certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals . . . .”). 
171 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
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categorically that “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas 
corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior 
application shall be dismissed.”172 Depending on how one defines a 
“claim,” this provision could have perverse results. Consider a prisoner 
convicted of burning the American flag before the Court’s decision in 
Texas v. Johnson establishing that this conduct is protected by the First 
Amendment.173 If his “claim” for purposes of determining the 
permissibility of a second or successive petition is a “First Amendment” 
claim, he would be barred from seeking collateral relief after the Texas 
v. Johnson decision if he had unsuccessfully raised a First Amendment 
claim in his first federal habeas petition, but not if he omitted the claim 
from his earlier petition. Such a regime would perversely disadvantage 
the petitioner who had the diligence and foresight to raise the claim 
earlier, only to have it dismissed under then-prevailing law. 
In cases brought by federal prisoners, the courts have (properly, in our 
view) avoided this problem by (implicitly) defining a “claim” narrowly 
for purposes of determining the permissibility of a second or successive 
petition. Thus, none of the cases leading up to Welch were rejected on 
the ground that the petitioners had already raised “vagueness” 
challenges prior to the Supreme Court’s articulation of the underlying 
new rule.174 The courts have thus apparently construed the term “claim” 
narrowly so that, in our hypothetical above, the relevant “claim” would 
be a “Texas v. Johnson” claim, rather than a “First Amendment” claim. 
Obviously, the petitioner could not have raised a “Texas v. Johnson 
claim” before the Texas v. Johnson decision was handed down, so 
Section 2244 would not bar him from raising the claim now in a second 
or successive petition. The courts have, in our view, properly adopted 
this interpretation to avoid perverse results. After Montgomery, we think 
this interpretation is further justified by the need to avoid a significant 
constitutional question. For the same reasons, in our view, Montgomery 
requires state courts to entertain a petition raising a claim after the 
 
172 Id. § 2244(b)(1). 
173 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989). 
174 In Welch itself, the petitioner had anticipated the Johnson v. United States vagueness 
holding by making that argument initially. The fact that it was rejected by the Eleventh 
Circuit prior to the decision in Johnson did not preclude him from raising it anew once 
Johnson, the new rule, was decided. 
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Supreme Court’s recognition of the new substantive rule even if the 
petitioner had unsuccessfully raised the claim earlier.175 
The second problem with the AEDPA rule on second or successive 
petitions unfortunately remains significant. According to AEDPA’s text, 
a prisoner’s ability to raise a claim based on a new rule in a second or 
successive petition depends not just on the Supreme Court’s recognition 
of a right that is retroactively applicable on collateral review, but in 
addition on the Supreme Court also having held specifically that this 
new rule is retroactively applicable on collateral review. In Tyler v. 
Cain, Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurring opinion made clear that 
a “new” rule has been “made retroactive on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court” if the retroactivity of the new rule follows “by strict 
logical necessity” from the Court’s prior decisions establishing when a 
new rule is retroactively applicable.176 Thus, if a new rule is clearly 
substantive, it will have been “made retroactive of collateral review by 
the Supreme Court” at the moment the Court recognizes the new rule 
(thanks to prior decisions clearly holding that all “substantive” rules are 
retroactive). But as Welch demonstrates, it will not always be clear 
whether a new rule qualifies as “substantive” or is, instead, procedural, 
and thus unenforceable through collateral post-conviction review unless 
it falls within the second Teague exception. In such cases, a prisoner 
may be able to raise the claim in a second federal habeas petition only 
after the Supreme Court has held in a later case that the new rule is, in 
fact, retroactively applicable. And, because the one-year statute of 
limitations begins to run when the Supreme Court initially recognizes 
the new rule, the prisoner will be able to raise his claim in a second or 
successive petition only if the Court “makes” the new rule retroactive (in 
a different case) within a year of the Court’s initial announcement of the 
new rule. If the Court does not render its decision confirming the 
retroactivity of the new rule within a year of its initial decision 
recognizing the new rule, prisoners will find themselves with zero time 
to seek federal habeas relief. 
 
175 Thus, for example, we disagree with decisions such as that of the Oregon Court of 
Appeals in Cunio v. Premo, 395 P.3d 25 (Or. App. 2017), which concluded that a claim 
seeking to enforce Miller v. Alabama retroactively in a state post-conviction proceeding was 
barred by the state’s rule against successive post-conviction petitions. An appeal in Cunio is 
currently pending before the Oregon Supreme Court. 
176 Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 670 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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With respect to federal prisoners, we think Montgomery now renders 
this regime constitutionally problematic (if it wasn’t already).177 
Montgomery establishes that federal prisoners have a constitutional right 
to collateral relief if their continued incarceration contravenes a new 
substantive rule of constitutional law (or, we think, a new rule falling 
within the second Teague exception). After Montgomery, a federal 
prisoner would have a good argument that AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations violates the Due Process Clause to the extent it denies him 
relief because the new rule was not “made retroactive by the Supreme 
Court” until more than a year after it was initially recognized by the 
Court. Under the Due Process Clause, prisoners must have “a reasonable 
opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and 
determined,”178 yet, through the interaction of AEDPA’s statute of 
limitations and its restriction on second or successive petitions, a federal 
prisoner might find himself with zero time to raise his claim for 
collateral relief. Because Congress can be presumed to have preferred 
that a constitutionally required remedy against federal officials be 
sought in the federal courts, AEDPA’s statute of limitations should be 
construed in a way that provides federal prisoners a constitutionally 
adequate amount of time to seek the constitutionally required remedy 
recognized in Montgomery. 
With respect to state prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal court, 
AEDPA’s regime for second or successive petitions is constitutionally 
valid (although senseless and harsh) only because federal habeas relief is 
constitutionally optional to begin with. There is no basis in Teague itself 
for concluding that the right to collateral relief is triggered only after a 
second Supreme Court decision holding the new rule falls within a 
Teague exception. (Indeed, as discussed above, Teague permits 
prisoners to seek initial recognition of new rules falling within the two 
exceptions via federal habeas.) Thus, we think that state courts are 
required to provide collateral review of claims based on new rules 
falling within a Teague exception upon the Supreme Court’s recognition 
of the right, without awaiting a second holding that the rule falls within a 
 
177 See Vladeck, supra note 58 (describing the constitutional and practical difficulties 
posed by AEDPA’s constraints on enforcing new rules through second or successive 
petitions). 
178 Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 93 (1955) (quoting Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 
574 (1948)). 
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Teague exception. In our view, Montgomery requires the states to waive 
any limit on second and successive petitions that would preclude or 
unduly burden a prisoner’s right to seek collateral relief on the basis of a 
new substantive rule of federal constitutional law after the Supreme 
Court has announced the new rule. Indeed, in light of the obstacles 
imposed by AEDPA to raising such a claim even in a first federal habeas 
petition, we think review of a state court’s denial of a petition for 
collateral review on the ground that a newly recognized rule is not 
applicable on collateral review offers the surest route to a Supreme 
Court holding that the new rule is retroactively applicable on collateral 
review.179 And, if the state has a statute of limitations for collateral 
relief, a state prisoner would be well advised to pursue state collateral 
relief instead of federal habeas, lest his time for filing a state petition 
expire while he is seeking federal review. 
3. Procedural Defaults 
A more difficult question is whether the state can deem the claim 
procedurally defaulted if the petitioner did not raise the claim at his trial 
or in his direct appeals, as most states do. Even if the claim is not 
supported by Supreme Court precedents directly on point, failure to raise 
a contemporaneous objection results in forfeiture of the claim as a 
matter of course. After Montgomery, does the Constitution require states 
to waive procedural defaults based on failure to contemporaneously 
object if the claim had not been recognized by the Supreme Court at the 
time of the trial? 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the novelty of the claim may 
be “cause” that would excuse a failure to contemporaneously object 
under certain circumstances. The novelty of the claim will constitute 
“cause” if the petitioner at the time of trial lacked the tools with which to 
construct the argument.180 In other words, if the Supreme Court’s 
 
179 This would particularly be the case if, as some have argued, the Court’s holding in 
Tyler (with respect to claims falling within the second Teague exception) also applies to 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations trigger, under which the statute begins to run on “the date on 
which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the 
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to 
cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C) (2012). See Appeals and Writs in 
Criminal Cases § 15.2 (Stella Lee ed., 3d ed. 2016 update). 
180 See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131 (1982).  
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recognition of the right was foreshadowed by earlier decisions, the 
petitioner will be expected to have anticipated the Court’s recognition of 
the right. As a practical matter, this standard means that the default will 
not be excused for prisoners convicted shortly before the Court’s 
recognition of the new rule, as the Court’s recognition of the new rule 
will usually be an incremental step in the evolution of constitutional 
doctrine. But a person convicted well before the recognition of the new 
rule will often have “cause” for his failure to raise the claim, as the 
precedents at that time of his trial will typically not have evolved to the 
point that he will have had the “tools with which to construct” the claim. 
The Court’s decisions defining “cause” have been framed as a basis 
for permitting habeas review in the federal courts despite a state 
procedural default.181 The Court has not said that the state courts 
themselves are required to excuse procedural defaults because of the 
novelty of the claim. But, as noted above, the conventional view before 
Montgomery was that the state courts were not required to afford state 
prisoners collateral review at all. Now that states are required to provide 
collateral relief for new substantive rules, the question arises whether the 
“cause” standard articulated by the Court is also applicable in the state 
courts. There would appear to be a strong case to be made that the 
Court’s standard for regarding the novelty of a new rule to be “cause” 
for excusing a procedural default is applicable to the state courts as a 
constitutional matter. 
On the other hand, AEDPA might be read to absolve the state courts 
of the obligation to consider claims that were procedurally defaulted 
because they were not raised at trial. As discussed above, AEDPA 
entitles state prisoners to habeas relief based on new substantive rules 
under the pre-AEDPA standard if the claim was not adjudicated on the 
merits in state court. If the claim was not raised by the petitioner at trial 
or direct appeals, then the claim will presumably not have been 
adjudicated on the merits in state court. If the petitioner raises the claim 
in a federal habeas petition after the Supreme Court’s initial recognition 
of the right, the federal habeas court will entertain the claim, despite the 
procedural default, if the petitioner can show “cause.” And he will be 
able to show cause if he lacked the tools with which to construct the 
argument. Thus, federal habeas relief will be available in precisely those 
 
181 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977). 
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cases in which the state courts would be required to entertain the claim if 
the “cause” standard were imposed on the state courts. If Montgomery 
requires that collateral relief be available in either state or federal courts, 
then the availability of federal habeas relief in precisely those cases that 
the state would regard as procedurally defaulted would obviate the 
question of the state’s obligation to excuse the default. 
We think the better reading of AEDPA is as offering state prisoners 
an additional forum for adjudicating their otherwise defaulted claims 
based on retroactively applicable new rules. To interpret AEDPA as 
giving the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over state prisoners’ 
otherwise defaulted collateral claims based on new substantive rules of 
constitutional law would run counter to the overall thrust of AEDPA, 
which is to give the state courts the first-line responsibility for enforcing 
the federal rights of state prisoners.182 The state courts have a duty under 
Montgomery to provide collateral review of state prisoners’ claims based 
on new substantive rules, and, in so doing, we think they must waive 
any procedural default based on the prisoner’s failure to raise the claim 
before the Supreme Court definitively recognized it, at least if the 
prisoner lacked the tools with which to construct the argument at the 
time of his trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the implications of reading Montgomery together with the 
Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence will have to be 
fleshed out over time, as new cases come up testing its implications. 
This Article is meant to open—but not close—the discussion of the far-
reaching consequences Montgomery is likely to have on the scope and 
availability of collateral post-conviction relief in both state and federal 
courts, especially for claims that the prisoner’s continued detention is 
unlawful based upon new rules of constitutional law. 
But Montgomery may prove to be even more important outside the 
specific context of retroactivity, for it is the first time the Supreme Court 
has ever held that at least some aspect of collateral post-conviction 
review is constitutionally required. In the process, Montgomery 
 
182 See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (noting that AEDPA intended 
to “channel prisoners’ claims first to the state courts” and “leaves primary responsibility with 
the state courts”).  
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necessarily opens the door to a reassessment of any number of features 
of collateral post-conviction review, most of which have historically 
been thought to be nothing more than the product of legislative grace. 
We have argued in this Article that, properly understood, the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Montgomery constitutionalized the Teague 
exceptions—and recognizes a constitutional right to a collateral post-
conviction remedy in such cases for state and federal prisoners alike. By 
holding that some aspects of post-conviction habeas are constitutionally 
grounded (and their remedies constitutionally compelled), the 
Montgomery decision potentially raises far-reaching questions about 
whether other aspects of habeas post-conviction review have 
constitutional underpinnings as well. 
 
